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ABSTRACT
Frequent compliance with the adjudicative decisions of interna-
tional institutions, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
is puzzling because these institutions do not have the power
domestic courts possess to impose sanctions. This Article uses game
theory to explain the power of international adjudication via a set
of expressive theories, showing how law can be effective without
sanctions. When two parties disagree about conventions that arise
in recurrent situations involving coordination, such as a convention
of deferring to territorial claims of first possessors, the pronounce-
ments of third-party legal decision makers-adjudicators--can
influence their behavior in two ways. First, adjudicative expression
may construct focal points that clarify ambiguities in the conven-
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tion. Second, adjudicative expression may provide signals that cause
parties to update their beliefs about the facts that determine how
the convention applies. Even without the power of sanctions or
legitimacy, an adjudicator's focal points and signals influence the
parties' behavior. After explaining the expressive power of adjudica-
tion, this Article applies the analysis to a range of third-party efforts
to resolve international disputes, including a comprehensive review
of the docket of the International Court of Justice. We find strong
empirical support for the theory that adjudication works by
clarifying ambiguous conventions or facts via cheap talk or signal-
ing. We claim that the theory has broad implications for under-
standing the power of adjudication generally.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1872, an international arbitral tribunal set up by treaty ruled
that Great Britain had to pay $15.5 million to the United States for
damages caused by a ship, the Alabama, built in Britain and sold to
the Confederacy during the Civil War.' The panel had no means of
enforcing its judgment, but Great Britain duly complied, launching
the modern era of interstate dispute resolution.2 Almost a century
later, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided a case that
facilitated the delimitation of the continental shelf between
Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands, ending a high stakes
dispute and allowing those countries to proceed in developing gas
and mineral resources.' Quite recently, the ICJ helped resolve a
diplomatic feud related to Belgium's attempt to arrest a former
Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Congo.4 In each of these cases,
and many more, international adjudication successfully resolved
significant conflict between nations. Adjudication generated
compliance notwithstanding the absence of external sanctions to
enforce the decisions. Compliance without centralized sanctions
contradicts our conventional image of how legal systems operate.
The result is a puzzle at the heart of international law. Given the
so-called "anarchic"5 environment of international relations, why
would nations bother to comply with the decisions of international
tribunals?
This question is part of a larger one. In recent years, political
scientists and international lawyers have identified compliance with
international law as the central problem for analysis.' Despite high
1. See 1 J.G. WETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCESS 27-173 (1979).
2. See JOHN G. COLLIER & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SErrLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 33 (1999).
3. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb.
20).
4. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.) 2002 I.C.J. 1
(Feb. 14), available at http'J/www.icj-cij.org.
5. HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SocIry: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS xii
(1964).
6. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 1-29 (1995); George W. Downs et al., Is the
Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INT'L ORG. 379, 379-80
(1996); Andrew Guzman, A Compliance Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV.
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profile instances of noncompliance, most writers seem to agree with
Louis Henkin's famous assessment that "almost all nations observe
almost all principles of international law and almost all of their
obligations almost all of the time."1 Scholars disagree, though, on
precisely why nations do so. Traditional international lawyers
contend that international law works because it is perceived largely
as morally authoritative and legitimate.' Realists have long
contended that international law is epiphenomenal, that nations
generally comply only because their international obligations are
usually congruent with national interests.9 Finally, institutionalists
claim that international institutions influence state behavior by
facilitating communication and disseminating information about
member nations.1 0 The choice between these theories goes to the
heart of whether international law matters: only by knowing the
1823, 1825 (2002); Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE
L.J. 1935 (2002); Daniel Ho, Compliance and International Soft Law: Why do Countries
Implement the Basle Accord?, 5 J. INTL ECON. L. 647, 647 (2002); Harold Hongu Koh, How
Is International Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397 (1999); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations
Obey International Law?, 106 YALE LJ. 2599 (1997); Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
International Law, International Relations and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 538-58 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002); Beth A. Simmons, Compliance with
International Agreements, 1 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 75, 75 (1998).
7. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (1979) (emphasis omitted); see also Charles
Kegley & Gregory Raymond, International Legal Norms and the Preservation of the Peace
1820-1964, 8 INT'L INTERACTIONS 171, 173 (1981) (providing empirical support for assertion
that national behavior is consistent with international law); David G. Victor & Kal Raustiala,
Conclusions, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 659, 661 (David G. Victor et al. eds.,
1998). But see Peter M. Haas, Choosing to Comply: Theorizing from International Relations
and Comparative Politics, in COMMITMENTAND COMPLIANCE 43,44 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000)
(explaining that 'empirical studies suggest that national compliance is uneven at best").
8. See, e.g., THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 41-49 (1990).
9. John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT'L SEC.
5, 6 (1995); see also 5 THUCYDIDES, THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONESSIAN WAR, reprinted in
THE LANDMARK THUCYDDES 352 (Richard Crawley trans., Robert B. Strassler ed., 1998)
(quoting the Athenians in a Melian dialogue, "right ... is only in question between equals in
power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must").
10. See ROBERT KEOHANE, ArE HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD
POLITICAL ECONOMY 49-64 (1984); Robert Axelrod & Robert 0. Keohane, Achieving
Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, in COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY
226 (Kenneth A. Oye ed., 1986); Robert 0. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of
Institutionalist Theory, 20 INT'L SEC. 39, 45 (1995); Beth Simmons, See You in 'Court"? The
Appeal to Quasi-Judicial Legal Processes in the Settlement of Territorial Disputes, in A ROAD
MAP TO WAR: TERRITORIAL DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 205,208 (Paul F. Diehl
ed., 1999) (using the term "rational functionalism" for the concept).
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reasons for compliance can we assess whether international law has
the potential to become a powerful independent force in world
affairs.
To date, however, the focus of the compliance literature has been
almost exclusively onprimary compliance with international norms,
embodied either in customary international law or in treaty
obligations." Relatively neglected is the question of secondary
compliance: why states comply with decisions rendered by interna-
tional courts. This is the question we address. Stated differently,
this Article seeks to explain why some states are willing to comply
with their primary international obligations only after a third party
adjudicator has articulated those obligations.
Our approach is both theoretical and empirical. The explanation
we offer is rooted in game theory, which has been used successfully
in a variety of problems in international organization. With few
exceptions, however, the central game concept has been the prison-
ers' dilemma. This Article focuses on a different concept- coordina-
tion. Coordination games describe situations where parties have
fully or partially common interests that can be achieved only if they
coordinate their strategies among multiple possible equilibria.'
2
Below, we explain why we think this model more closely approxi-
mates many strategic situations in the real world. This Article seeks
to move coordination to a central place in the evolving study of
international law and institutions.
A focus on coordination produces the Article's principle theoretical
contribution-an expressive theory of adjudication. Our expressive
claim has four steps. First, we contend that the need for coordina-
tion is pervasive, even in situations of international conflict. For
example, when the value of disputed territory is low relative to the
costs of military action, international competition for territory takes
the form of a coordination game known as Hawk/Dove. In this case,
each nation prefers to gain the territory by having the other side
defer to its claim, but each considers the worst possible outcome to
11. See Simmons, supra note 6, at 78 (characterizing "compliance with standing,
substantive rules often embodied in treaty arrangements" as first order compliance as
contrasted with second order compliance with third-party decision making) (citations
omitted).
12. EIC RASMUSFN, GAES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 29 (3d
ed. 2001).
2004] 1235
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be a military conflict resulting from mutual claims to the territory.
Thus, despite their conflicting interest over territory, the parties
may have a common interest in avoiding war.
Second, we use evolutionary game theory to explain how conven-
tions emerge over time-even in a state of anarchy-from the
interactions of players in coordination situations.' 3 Such conventions
often benefit players by avoiding conflict and maintaining coopera-
tion. For example, for those territorial disputes that take the form
of the Hawk/Dove game, nations may come to expect that the first
possessor of a territory will play Hawk and that others will play
Dove. As long as every nation can determine who the first possessor
is, the property-like convention will avoid conflict.
Third, we describe why conventions are inevitably imperfect.
Ambiguities in the underlying expectations, and in the facts the
convention makes relevant, prevent players from coordinating in
every situation. For example, a first possession convention regard-
ing territory will fail to coordinate expectations in cases where there
are divergent understandings of what constitutes possession,
divergent understandings about possible exceptions to the posses-
sion convention, or divergent beliefs about the particular facts that
define possession. Uncoordinated expectations will lead to conflict,
as two nations play Hawk expecting the other to play Dove.
Finally, we explain how a third party's expression can resolve
ambiguity, in the convention or the facts, and thereby influence
behavior of players in a coordination game. We do not place any
reliance on the nations' ideological commitments, such as a
perceived obligation to obey legitimate adjudicative determinations.
Instead, expression works partly as cheap talk 14-- by constructing
a focal point around which parties coordinate-and partly because
third-party signals cause players to update their beliefs about the
state of the world. In either case, expression can change the action
a selfish party chooses to play. We also identify why adjudication
combining cheap talk and signaling exerts a more powerful
influence on the parties' behavior than either type of expression can
achieve in isolation. The resulting theory of adjudication has broad
application, not only explaining international adjudication but also
13. See infra Part II.B.1.
14. See infra Part II.C.l.a.
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broader comparative questions of dispute resolution and the origins
of domestic systems of adjudication.
On the empirical side, we test our theory by considering a variety
of evidence about international adjudication. We examine the early
history of international dispute resolution, provide three extended
case studies of major adjudications prior to the creation of the ICJ,
and conduct a quantitative analysis of the decisions of this latter
tribunal. Indeed, we have conducted the most comprehensive
empirical review to date of the contentious docket of the ICJ, which
we contend provides considerable support for our expressive theory
of adjudication.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I begins by stating more
carefully the puzzle of compliance with international adjudication.
Part II presents the expressive theory of adjudication. This part
claims that coordination games can be used to describe a broad
range of international phenomena. It also explains how third-party
dispute resolution resolves coordination problems expressively. Part
III discusses various examples of international dispute resolution
from the perspective of this expressive theory with special attention
to the docket of the ICJ. We argue that dispute resolution processes
help parties resolve the underlying and ubiquitous problem of
coordinating among multiple equilibria. The last Part provides a
conclusion.
I. THE PUZZLE OF COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATION
A. Unexplained Compliance with International Dispute Resolution
Studying compliance with international norms raises certain
methodological issues. Oran Young defines compliance as
"occur[ing] when the actual behavior of a given subject conforms to
prescribed behavior, and non-compliance or violation occurs when
actual behavior departs significantly from prescribed behavior."'
Measuring the level of compliance with international norms, how-
ever, is not straightforward. As Beth Simmons notes: "[Clompliance
15. Simmons, supra note 6, at 77 (quoting ORAN R. YOUNG, COMPLIANCE AND PUBLIC
AUTHORrrY 104 (1979)).
2004] 1237
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is rarely a transparent, binary choice. Actors' behavior is often
intentionally ambiguous, dilatory, or confusing, and frequently
takes place under conditions in which verification ... is difficult....
[and] highly context-specific."' 6 Compliance with, for example, a
ruling of the ICJ may be decades in coming, with a different
outcome than the one the court required, albeit one that still
satisfies the parties.
Notwithstanding these problems, studies of international
adjudication find a high degree of compliance. In the introduction
we gave three noteworthy illustrations-compliance with the
decisions rendered in the Alabama (1872), North Sea Continental
Shelf (1969), and Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April
2000 (2002). 17 More generally, previous scholars have claimed
there is complete or nearly complete compliance with final
decisions (on the merits) of the ICJ."5 In a later section, we present
an exhaustive review of the ICJ docket and conservatively estimate
compliance with ICJ decisions to be sixty-eight percent, although
some real noncompliance also is identified.'9 Similarly, studies of
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade
Organization (WTO) dispute resolution find "quite high" levels of
compliance.2"
This high level of compliance is a puzzle for rational choice
theory. Rationalist approaches fail to predict compliance with
international judicial institutions, such as the ICJ, because they
16. Id at 78-79 (citations omitted); see also Richard Bilder, Beyond Compliance: Helping
Nations Cooperate, in COMMITMENTAND COMPLIANCE, supra note 7, at 65,67 ("Obligation and
no-obligation, compliance and breach, shade imperceptibly into one another .... Issues of
compliance and breach are frequently part of the ongoing game or process of international
interaction rather than something subsequent to and apart from it."); Haas, supra note 7, at
61-64 (discussing constructivism and compliance).
17. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
18. COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 2, at 178 (claiming that previously "all decisions were,
sooner or later, complied with") (citation omitted); COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL COURTS 35 (M.K Bulterman & M. Kuijer eds., 1996) (explaining that most
decisions are complied with).
19. See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., ROBERT E. HUDEc, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION
OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 286 (1993); Warren F. Schwartz & Alan 0. Sykes, The
Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization,
31 J. LEGAL STuD. 179, 200 (2002) (finding "the level of compliance with trade commitments
is quite high').
1238 [Vol. 45:1229
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lack the power to sanction a nation for failing to comply. 2' In the
absence of centralized sanctions, a rationalist must wonder why
there is any compliance with the adjudications of international
institutions.
One possible answer is selection bias. If the only cases that go
before international bodies for dispute resolution are those most
capable of resolution, either because of their stakes or the issue area
involved, then high compliance is unsurprising. Some argue,
therefore, that the fact of compliance cannot tell us much about
compliance in general or the power of international law to constrain
state behavior.22
Selection bias exists, but it does not resolve the puzzle of
adjudicatory compliance. Even if international dispute resolution
draws the "easy cases," selection biases leave unexplained what
it is about certain cases that make them easy to resolve. If one be-
lieves the realist critique that international law is epiphenomenal,
then there should be no easy cases. A realist might, of course,
maintain that parties would undertake the same behavior in the
absence of dispute resolution. But this is implausible; if parties
knew in advance the precise solution to their dispute, based on their
relative power, they would not bother going through the process of
third-party dispute resolution, which is costly and time consuming.
States would not turn to third parties unless they played some role
in helping the states to resolve problems. Consequently, if states do
not know in advance the precise solution to their dispute, then the
process of international dispute resolution has had some effect and
has generated compliance.
A second possible answer to the puzzle of compliance is reputa-
tion.23 Andrew Guzman argues that concerns about reputation can
21. In contrast, traditional international lawyers who focus on legitimacy as the primary
determinant of compliance tend to overpredict compliance. See Downs et al., supra note 6, at
380-82.
22. See id. at 383 (noting that "we do not know what a high compliance rate really
implies").
23. See P. K Huth, Deterrence and International Conflict, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCL 25, 41-42
(1999) (explaining that there are relatively few studies on international reputations); Beth
Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in
International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 819, 820 (2000) ("[Glovernments make
commitments to further their interests and comply with them to preserve their reputation for
predictable behavior in the protection of property rights."); Simmons, supra note 10, at 210
2004] 1239
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secure compliance, particularly where stakes are low.24 With low
stakes, the reputation benefits that states will obtain from compli-
ance will offset the costs of noncooperation. Reputation is, however,
an incomplete way of explaining compliance with international
adjudication. If reputation were strong enough to compel compliance
with adjudication, one wonders why it was not also strong enough
to resolve the dispute without adjudication. Why is reputation too
weak to induce compliance before a third party pronounces a
nation's legal obligations, but still strong enough to induce compli-
ance after such a pronouncement?
A related problem with the reputation explanation is the fact that
reputation may be compartmentalized across states.25 The United
States might flout international obligation X owed to, say, Iran but
at the same time fulfill obligation X to India, Peru, and Germany.
If so, what will the latter three states infer about a judicial decision
that finds the United States failed to observe the obligation vis-h-vis
Iran? The states might infer that the United States is less likely to
cooperate with them in the future, which means they might find it
worthwhile to diminish their cooperation with the United States
at the present time. This reaction would constitute a reputation
sanction for the United States' breach of its obligation to Iran.
But there is another possibility. India, Peru, and Germany might
perceive that the United States has strong interests in maintaining
cooperation with them that do not exist for Iran. The three states
may then reason that they can safely ignore the United States'
breach of its legal obligations to Iran. If so, the United States
suffers no loss of reputation among any states other than the one to
whom it breaches its obligations. If breaching its obligations to
Iran creates no reputation spillover to its relationship with other
countries, then the United States should also be willing to ignore
its legal obligations to Iran, both before and after international
adjudication.
(arguing that states comply because long-run reputational cost outweighs short-term gain).
24. Guzman, supra note 6, at 1883 ("The likelihood that reputational effects will be
sufficient to ensure compliance grows smaller as the stakes grow larger.").
25. See George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International
Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 108-09 (2002) (describing how segmented reputations develop).
[Vol. 45:12291240
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In the end, perhaps reputation will have a role to play in explain-
ing adjudication, but not without a greater understanding of how
third-party expression changes the reputation calculus. The puzzle
of compliance thus remains. We need to understand why and for
what cases states turn to international institutions for dispute
resolution.
B. The Broader Puzzle of Compliance Without Sanctions
Compliance with international adjudication is actually only one
illustration of the more general problem of explaining compliance
in contexts where a tribunal lacks coercive enforcement power.
Obvious examples include certain alternative forms of dispute
resolution, such as nonbinding arbitration. Even in a nation's
courts, however, enforcement is often less effective than deterrence
theorists might think necessary to compel compliance. Historically,
we know of at least one legal system that shared many features
with the current system of international law. For several hundred
years, Iceland had a stable legal system not unlike the current
international system.26 It had a type of legislature to make laws,
and courts to decide cases, but no public enforcement of the courts'
decisions. In other words, Icelandic institutions made law and
declared rights, but no governmental institutions existed to enforce
those declarations.
When someone won a court case in Iceland, enforcement would be
left to private parties.2 ' Typically, legal cases involved killing of an
individual for which blood money had to be paid. If one failed to
pay damages as determined by an adverse judgment, the original
claimant could come back to the adjudicator, who would then
declare the defaulting defendant an outlaw (meaning the defendant
could be killed without the killer incurring legal liability).28
Consider the puzzle though: The immunity granted to the killer of
an outlaw is merely the right to be free from judgments issued by
26. See DAvID FRIEDMAN, LAw's ORDER 263-67 (2000); Richard Posner, Medieval Iceland
and Modern Legal Scholarship, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1495, 1496-97 (1992) (reviewing WILLIAM
I. MuLE, BLOoDTAKING AND PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAWAND SOCITY IN SAGA ICELAND (1990)).
27. FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 264.
28. Id.
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a court that had no power to enforce its judgments. Without
adjudicatory enforcement power, it is not apparent why the
defendant would feel any more protected when his death would
produce a judicial declaration of liability than when it would not.
Yet, despite the purely expressive power of the court, the Icelandic
system provided sufficient incentives for many people to pay
judgments. 9
The legal institutions in the international system are similar to
those in medieval Iceland. Several international institutions are
quasi-legislative in their power to create law, while a proliferating
number of judicial institutions adjudicate disputes. But interna-
tional law still famously lacks a central enforcer, in other words, an
executive. This so-called "anarchic"s situation means that laws
must be enforced frequently through self-help. Yet, like the
pronouncements of the court in medieval Iceland, the decisions of
international tribunals are still largely effective in the cases
presented to them."1 Compliance with international adjudication
will help explain the Icelandic courts and more generally provide
insights into the evolution of domestic court systems. In the next
Part, we offer a theory that explains judicial compliance in both
contexts.
29. While this system would seem to allow the stronger parties to avoid payingjudgments
rendered against them, Iceland had a market in claims, so that a successful but weak
claimant could transfer his claim to a stronger party for enforcement of the judgment. This
system worked so long as power asymmetries among the players were not too great.
Apparently Iceland had some social surplus, but not an enormous one. There were enough
resources to support a few public officials. There were not enough resources, however, so that
a powerful individual could hire enough other powerful people as retainers to form a state.
Presumably, whenever one faction would gather a number of powerful individuals so as to try
to coerce others, it would lose judgments. As the number ofjudgments against the prospective
ruler rose, so did the incentive for other powerful individuals to challenge the person so as to
gain the payment due earlier but weaker plaintiffs. This may have created a mechanism for
internal stability and an equilibrium of power. See id. at 263-67.
30. BULL, supra note 5, at 130.
31. Of course, there are some important distinctions. Arguably, inequality of power is
more severe in the international system than in a society of individuals. See FRIEDMAN, supra
note 26, at 265-67.
1242 [Vol. 45:1229
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II. THE COORDINATING FUNCTION OF ADJUDICATION
Several writers recently have applied concepts of game theory to
international law.32 Game theory discussions of international law,
like other uses of game theory in law, focus frequently on n-person
versions of the prisoners' dilemma.3 Though we do not dispute that
this model provides great insight into the situations nations and
individuals frequently face, we join a small group of theorists' who
explicitly stress the significance of a different and equally frequent
32. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis ofInternational
Law, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 43-44 (1999); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of
Customary International Law, 66 U. CHi. L. REV. 1113, 1121 (1999); John K. Setear, An
Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and
International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139, 147 (1996); John K Setear, Responses to Breach
of a Treaty and Rationalist International Relations Theory: The Rules of Release and
Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility, 83 VA. L. REV. 1, 123-
26 (1997); Paul Stephan, Courts, Tribunals and Legal Unification-The Agency Problem, 3
CHI. J. INTY L. 333, 338-43 (2002); Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DUKE L.J. 559,
573-82 (2002).
33. The dominance of the prisoners' dilemma model in international law discussions
applying game theory reflects the centrality of that model in international relations theory.
See KEOHANE, supra note 10, at 67-84; Stephen Haggard & Beth A. Simmons, Theories of
International Regimes, 41 INTL ORG. 491, 504-06 (1987); Walter Mattli, Private Justice in a
Global Economy: From Litigation to Arbitration, 55 INVL ORG. 919, 922-23 (2001).
34. The closest theoretical approach to our own is found in Geoffrey Garrett & Barry R.
Weingast, Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the European Community's Internal
Market, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFs, INSTITrTIONS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE (Judith
Goldstein & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 1993). In particular, Garrett & Weingast stress the
importance of coordination that exists within an iterated prisoners' dilemma game, the way
that ambiguity can undermine cooperative solutions, and the ability of focal points to stabilize
cooperation around a particular understanding. Our approach differs in the following ways:
we generalize the problem of coordination by discussing additional games, particularly
Hawk/Dove; we use evolutionary game theory to identify three forms of ambiguity that infect
conventions; we propose a signaling model that works in conjunction with a cheap talk
construction of focal points to explain adjudication; and we apply the model to international
adjudication.
In addition, there is some literature on coordination as it relates to various aspects of
international law and relations. Perhaps the earliest piece is Duncan Snidal, Coordination
Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM.
POL. SCI. REv. 923 (1985). See also Kenneth W. Abbott, "Trust But Verify&": The Production of
Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements, 26 CORNELL INTL
L.J. 1, 20-23 (1993) (using Stag Hunt games); Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International
Relations Theory and International Law, 52 STAN. L. REV. 959, 964 (2000); Goldsmith &
Posner, supra note 32, at 1134 (asserting that customs can emerge when one solution becomes
focal); Stephen D. Krasner, Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto
Frontier, 43 WORLD POL. 336, 336-49, 351-65 (1991).
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strategic problem, that of coordination.' Even when nations or
individuals have common interests, they may fail to reach their
mutually best outcome because they may fail to coordinate.
To illustrate, consider a slight alteration in the story from which
prisoners' dilemma gets its name. Suppose the prosecutor has
enough evidence to convict two prisoners of a serious crime unless
they have a good alibi; because the prisoners are guilty, their only
chance to fabricate an alibi is for each to provide an alibi for the
other. The prisoners then know they must offer an alibi at the first
opportunity to be believed by the ultimate factfinder, but the
prosecutor separates them before they can communicate what alibi
to use. The prisoners know they will fail to persuade the factfinder
if they offer different alibis (e.g., A says she was at B's apartment
while B says she was at A's apartment). Because they had not
agreed in advance, their exact convergence of interests will not
guarantee that they reach their mutually preferred outcome. They
may fail to coordinate.
At the societal level, the most common illustration of a coordina-
tion game is the decision as to which side of the road to drive. Each
driver has the same interests as every other driver, namely to drive
on the same side of the road as everyone else-whether it be left
or right. Yet without some coordinating mechanism, there is no
guarantee that all drivers will initially choose the same side.
Noncoordination will cause traffic accidents. Thus, a total concur-
rence of interests does not guarantee that the parties will coordinate
on either of their best outcomes.
It is important to note that these two examples are pure coordina-
tion games because the parties' interests are perfectly aligned.
Although nations sometimes may find themselves in a pure
coordination game, we think it obviously far more common that
nations have divergent interests. Probably for this reason, many
theorists slight the significance of "mere coordination.""6 This view
35. On coordination games, see generally RUSsELL W. COOPER, COORDINATION GAMEs:
COMPLEMNTARrrTES AND MACROECONOMICS (1999); EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALT, THE
EMERGENCE OF NoRMs 74-133 (1977); Robert Sugden, Conventions, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DicTIONARY OF ECoNOMICs AND THE LAW 453-60 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
36. Guzman, supra note 6, at 1859; see also Downs et al., supra note 6, at 579-80; Benedict
Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of
International Law, 19 MICH. J. INTL L. 345, 345-48 (1998); Antonio F. Perez, The
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is erroneous. Although pure coordination games are rare, whether
between individuals or nations, that does not mean that coordina-
tion is rarely significant. To the contrary, even when nations have
some sharply divergent interests, they may also retain some
interest in coordinating their conduct. Thomas Schelling called
these situations "mixed motive" games.37 These mixed motive games
model common situations, including many disputes between
nations. Indeed, because the world is complex, it is more likely that
two nations will have a mix of shared and conflicting interests
rather than only shared interests or only conflicting interests.
There are a number of mixed motive games involving coordina-
tion which are useful for modeling international relations. Catalog-
ing these various games and the international situations they
represent might obscure the focus of this Article, which is to
demonstrate how adjudication works expressively in any setting
involving coordination. Thus, for the purpose of brevity this Article
will focus primarily on one mixed motive game, alternatively called
Hawk/Dove or Chicken. This game illustrates how adjudication
works expressively, although these findings generally apply to other
coordination games.
This Part proceeds as follows: Section A introduces examples of
mixed games of conflict and cooperation. Section B describes the
results that occur when nations encounter such coordination
situations repeatedly over time. This iteration can produce con-
ventions-a form of spontaneous order that emerges even in a state
of anarchy. Although conventions facilitate coordination, Section B
also describes two kinds of ambiguity that undermine conventions
and impede coordination. Section C then describes how mere
expression can resolve these ambiguities and thereby facilitate
coordination between nations. Expressive adjudication works both
as a signal of the third party's beliefs and as a way of constructing
a focal point. Section D then extends this basic model to answer
certain objections. Finally, Section E notes the limits to expressive
International Recognition of Judgments: The Debate Between Private and Public Law
Solutions, 19 BEKLEY J. INTI'L L. 44, 59 n.72 (2001) (contrasting problems of "true
cooperation" like the prisoners' dilemma with those of "mere coordination").
37. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 89 (1963).
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adjudication-situations where achieving compliance requires the
threat of sanctions.
A. The Pervasive Problem of Coordination
As noted above, most applied game theory is fixated on the n-
person prisoners' dilemma game. We wish to redirect some of this
scholarly energy toward the problem of coordination. This section
illustrates the pervasiveness of the coordination problem with two
(of many possible) examples. First, the section identifies the
underappreciated coordination element in the iterated prisoners'
dilemma game. We do not want readers to infer that our subsequent
focus on the Hawk/Dove game arises because the element of
coordination is peculiar to that less familiar situation. Second,
this section introduces Hawk/Dove, which models many disputes
between nations.
1. Coordination in the Iterated Prisoners'Dilemma Game
In legal theory and political theory, the most familiar game by far
is the one-shot prisoners' dilemma (PD). The PD game is ubiquitous
in legal, political, and economic analysis.s As Figure 1 illustrates,
given the payoffs, R (the row player) prefers defecting no matter
what C (the column player) does. If C cooperates, R receives 59 from
defecting and 2 from cooperating; if C defects, R receives 1 from
defecting and 0 from cooperating. Because C's incentives are the
same, the only equilibrium is Defect/Defect, which is Pareto-inferior
to Cooperate/Cooperate.
38. See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECrm ACTION (1982); KEOHANE, supra note 10;
MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LoGic OF COLLEcTrvE ACTION (1968); RASMUSEN, supra note 12, at
19-21; Thomas W. Merrill, Pluralism, The Prisoner's Dilemma, and the Behavior of the
Independent Judiciary, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 396 (1993); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Reciprocal
Altruism as a Felony: Antitrust and the Prisoner's Dilemma, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1906 (1988).
39. Ordinarily, those numbers reflect a standardized unit of preference satisfaction such
as "utils." One can instead imagine them as dollars or some other material benefit if those
tangible effects are the only consequences of the different outcomes and if there are no
differences in the marginal value of single unit of the benefit at different levels of
consumption.
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Figure 1: A PD Game
Cooperate Defect
2 5
Cooperate 2 0
01
Defect 5
Almost as familiar as the dismal prediction of the one-shot PD
game is the more complex equilibrium prediction when the game is
repeated indefinitely. Under this condition, the folk theorem
recognizes the additional possibility of mutual cooperation. If the
discount rate is sufficiently low, meaning that players care enough
about the future, they may each forgo defection to preserve the
possibility of future cooperation. Thus, they may play some contin-
gently cooperative strategy, like the Tit-for-Tat strategy made
famous by Robert Axelrod.' ° Mutual defection across every round
still remains a possibility, however. Thus, there are multiple (pure
strategy) equilibria to the iterated PD game. The players will seek
to coordinate among these equilibria."'
There is a second, more substantive reason for regarding the
iterated PD game as at least potentially a game of coordination:
Even where the parties can successfully assure each other that they
40. That strategy is to cooperate on the first round and then, in each subsequent round,
to play the same strategy that the opponent played in the prior round. ROBERTAXELROD, THE
EVOLUFION OF COOPERATION (1984). For an excellent discussion, see Paul G. Mahoney & Chris
W. Sanchirico, Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm Efficient?, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 2027 (2001) [hereinafter Mahoney & Sanchirico, is the Fittest Norm Efficient]. For
an argument favoring an alternative reciprocal strategy, termed 'Def-for-Dev," see Paul G.
Mahoney & Chris W. Sanchirico, Norms, Repeated Games, and the Role of Law, 91 CAL. L.
REV. 1281, 1291-99 (2003).
41. Assuming players value the future sufficiently, each wants to play Tit-for-Tat if the
other does, yet each still wants to play All Defect if the other does. Mutual Tit-for-Tat
produces a higher payoff for each than does All Defect, but Tit-for-Tat is riskier than All
Defect because of the particularly low payoff one gets from cooperating in the first round if
the other player defects. Thus, when players value the future sufficiently, the iterated PD
game presents something like a Stag Hunt game, a type of coordination game. See Mahoney
& Sanchirico, Is the Fittest Norm Efficient?, supra note 40, at 2140-42.
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will cooperate, there often will be more than one way to cooperate.
When there are two or more means of cooperating, each of which
can produce an equally desirable outcome, the players need to
coordinate on one particular means of cooperation. A few other
theorists have noted this coordination aspect of the iterated PD
game,42 but its significance has not been fully appreciated.4"
Consider an international trade example. Assume that trade
barriers result from a PD as follows: two sovereign leaders each
realize they are better off with free trade rather than mutual trade
barriers, but given the influence of domestic interest groups, each
leader prefers to impose import barriers in a given round, regard-
less of the other leader's decision. Because the trade game is
repeated, however, mutual cooperation, where each nation lowers
the barriers, is a possible outcome. In this case, the defect strategy
is clear: maintain trade barriers at existing levels. What about
"cooperation"? In the conventional description of a PD game, such
as that in Figure 1, some specified lowering of barriers is the only
means of cooperating. The problem of trade barriers is more
complex, however, and it may create multiple means of cooperating.
For example, facially nondiscriminatory domestic health and safety
regulations can create implicit tariffs when they impose greater
costs on imported goods than on domestically produced goods." A
free trade agreement must include some control of implicit tariffs,
but there are a variety of possible solutions: nations might lock in
their existing regulations, permit new regulations only when
42. To our knowledge, the only discussion of the point within law and economics occurs
in two articles by Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner,
Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. 115 (2002); Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 32. Perhaps the first and most
elaborate statement is found in Garrett & Weingast, supra note 34, at 179. See also Barry R.
Weingast, A Rational Choice Perspective on the Role of Ideas: Shared Belief Systems and State
Sovereignty in International Cooperation, 23 POL. & SoCY' 449 (1995).
43. We find no reference to the point in standard texts on applied game theory. See, e.g.,
RASMUSEN, supra note 12, at 18.
44. For instance, nation A might ban the sale of food products exposed to a particular
pesticide. Suppose that the pesticide is widely used in nation B but not in nation A, and
suppose further that alternative pesticides do not work as well in nation B as in nation A
(perhaps because the insect species that attack crops are hardier in nation B). As a result, the
pesticide regulation raises the costs of producing food products in nation B for export to nation
A. In turn, the higher production costs raise the price of food imported into nation A, and
therefore, the regulation works like a tariff.
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previously adopted by some other benchmark nation, or permit such
regulations while requiring additional offsetting tariffreductions to
neutralize their trade effect. Thus, there is more than one way to
cooperate; the nations need to select among cooperative "plans."
If at least two cooperative plans produce the Pareto-optimal
payoffs, then we have added a second level of required coordination
to the iterated PD game. Instead of facing the simple defect or
cooperate options, the players face a choice that includes defect,
cooperate by plan 1, or cooperate by plan 2. If the game is repeated
indefinitely between two players who value the future sufficiently,
many equilibria now emerge, including: (1) mutual Tit-for-Tat
where the players understand that only the behavior required by
plan 1 constitutes cooperation, (2) mutual Tit-for-Tat where the
players understand that only the behavior required by plan 2
constitutes cooperation, and (3) all defect. At best, if the players
choose different cooperative plans, they will achieve an outcome
that is Pareto-inferior to following the same cooperative plan.
Worse, players seeking cooperation on the basis of different plans
may interpret each other's behavior as defection. If so, the result of
uncoordinated cooperative efforts is a cascade of defection.
Given the complexity of the real world, the idea that there is
usually only one efficient means of cooperating, let alone one
immediately known to both parties, seems doubtful. Thus, if the
iterated PD game models common situations, as theorists assume,
then the need for coordination is likely to be pervasive.
2. Coordination in the Hawk/Dove Game
Now we turn to a less familiar game, but one that is particularly
useful for describing certain conflicts that law can sometimes
resolve expressively. The game is called Hawk/Dove or Chicken.
Starting with Figure 1, suppose six of the eight payoffs from the
PD game are held constant, represented by the three outcomes
of Cooperate/Cooperate, Defect/Cooperate, and Cooperate/Defect.
Suppose we change only the two payoffs for the outcome Defect/
Defect by lowering each from 1 to -1. Along with a re-labeling of the
strategies (for reasons explained below, we replace Cooperate with
Dove and Defect with Hawk), the result is Figure 2.
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Figure 2: A Hawk/Dove or Chicken Game
Dove Hawk
2 5
Dove
2 0
0 -1
Hawk 5 -1
In some respects, the payoffs differ only slightly from the one-shot
PD game. The essential difference is that the ranking of the third
and fourth best outcomes is reversed.' The simple reversal in payoff
rankings, however, produces a large behavioral change. There are
now two pure strategy equilibria:' Hawk/Dove and Dove/Hawk.
Thus, even in the one-shot Hawk/Dove game, and also in the
iterated version, multiple equilibria exist.
A common interpretation of the Hawk/Dove game is that the
players are disputing over a resource, broadly understood. Each
player chooses between an aggressive Hawk strategy, insisting on
getting the resource, and a passive Dove strategy, deferring to the
other. When Hawk is played against Dove, the player using the
aggressive strategy gains the disputed resource while the other
player receives nothing. When Dove is played against Dove, the
players divide the resource or allocate it randomly between
themselves. When Hawk is played against Hawk, the players clash
in some costly way. The alternative name for this game, "Chicken,"
comes from a classic James Dean movie depicting a dangerous
contest where teenagers drive their cars directly at each other to see
45. In Figure 1, each player ranks his payoff in the southeast cell as the third best
outcome; but now, in Figure 2, each player ranks his payoff in that cell as the fourth best (i.e.,
the worst) outcome. By contrast, in Figure 1, each player ranks the bad mismatch payoff (the
lower of the two payoffs in the northeast and southwest cells, which represent a mismatch in
strategies) as the fourth best (i.e., the worst) outcome instead of the third best outcome as in
Figure 2.
46. An equilibrium is defined as a strategy combination where each player pursues a best
strategy. RASMUSEN, supra note 12, at 18. In other words, at an equilibrium, no player has
an incentive to unilaterally change strategies because each is playing his best response to
what the others are doing.
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who will "chicken out" and swerve to avoid a collision. The outcome
of two aggressive strategies is a head-on collision."7 The same
analysis applies to drivers at an intersection, who are less inter-
ested in honor than in proceeding without delay while the other
waits.
More generally, the name "Hawk/Dove" derives from the idea that
the Hawk/Hawk outcome is any kind of fighting. Although the
outcome of Hawk/Hawk for each player is uncertain, as one might
win or lose the fight, the expected value is the worst possible
outcome for both players because the cost of fighting is high relative
to the value of the disputed resource. Thus, the coordination
aspect is that both players wish to avoid the nonequilibrium
outcome of Hawk/Hawk. The players have conflicting motives,
however, because each prefers to play Hawk to the other's Dove. "
In sum, the need for coordination is pervasive. Thepure coordina-
tion game often used to illustrate the idea of coordination is rare.
The problem of coordination arises in many situations, however,
including the iterated PD game and the Hawk/Dove game, both
of which model strategic situations that commonly arise among
nations.
47. See REBEL WITHOUT A CAUSE (Warner Brothers 1955); see also KEITH MURNIGHAN,
THE DYNAMICS OF BARGAiNING GAMES 116-28 (1991).
48. In sections below focusing on territorial conflict between nations, we will make
extensive use of this interpretation of the Hawk/Dove game. -For now, however, consider a
wholly different interpretation of Figure 2 that is also relevant to the international arena.
Imagine that some third party has violated a legal rule or norm, and that players R and C are
the two potential enforcers who could sanction the third party. Assume also that effective
enforcement requires only one nation to act. Enforcement is costly, so R and C each selfishly
prefer that the other incur the cost of enforcement, but each regards nonenforcement as the
worst possible outcome. Thus, Hawk here represents nonenforcement and Dove represents
incurring the cost of enforcement. The game is similar to a prisoners' dilemma game because
each prefers free-riding on the effort of the other, the key difference is that each also prefers
doing his part if the other does not do his part. An example might be the use of military force
to enforce peace treaties or United Nations resolutions. When two warring nations sign a
peace accord, other states in the region might prefer that some state send military forces to
enforce the peace, even if the state itself has to do it, but each would most prefer that others
do the enforcement.
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B. The Emergence of "Imperfect" Conventions in Iterated
Coordination Games
Because there is no central enforcer for nations, theorists often
liken international relations to anarchy or the "state of nature" that
Thomas Hobbes described as existing between individuals prior to
the creation of a state. 9 According to the Hobbesian view, the only
power that can bring order to the state of nature is force;' ° in
particular, it is necessary to create a sovereign by giving him a
monopoly on force. By contrast, David Hume argued that order can
arise more gradually from the state of nature, even in the absence
of a state.5 Evolutionary game theory describes how such spontane-
ous order can occur.52
In this section, we briefly review this game theory literature and
use it to explain how order can emerge among nations even in the
absence of a central enforcer. We call this form of order a conven-
tion.53 Although conventions represent successful coordination, gaps
in conventions always exist, and these imperfections represent a
failure to coordinate. In a later section, we contend that interna-
tional adjudication influences the behavior of states by perfecting
(i.e., completing or clarifying) these conventions.
1. The Evolution of Conventions: Background
When a population of players repeatedly encounters a particular
game, repetition can eventually produce strong expectations about
what strategies others will use. The resulting expectations fre-
49. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 186 (C.B. MacPherson ed., 1968).
50. Id.
51. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 484 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 2d ed.
1978).
52. See, e.g., KG. BINMORE, 1 GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. PLAYING FAIR
(1994); DREw FUDENBERG & DAVID K LEVINE, THE THEORY OF LEARNING IN GAMES (1998);
LARRY SAMUELSON, EVOLUTIONARY GAMEs AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION (1997); H. PEYrON
YOUNG, INDIVIDUAL STRATEGY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE: AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF
INSTrUTIONS (1998).
53. See Richard H. McAdams, Conventions and Norms: Philosophical Aspects, in 4
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 2735-41 (Neil J.
Smelser & Paul B. Balkes eds., 2001). For a similar definition, see Sugden, supra note 35, at
453-60. The origin of the rational choice analysis of conventions is in DAVID LEWIS,
CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1969).
1252 [Vol. 45:1229
ADJUDICATING IN ANARCHY
quently produce a convention. This section will briefly describe some
of the evolutionary game theory literature about the emergence of
conventions, but in keeping with our general approach, we do not
formally derive the results. We will also illustrate the point using
only the iterated Hawk/Dove game, but it should be fairly straight-
forward to see how conventions arise in other iterated coordination
games, such as the iterated PD game."
In game theory, the term "convention" does not refer to an
international agreement or treaty, but to a particular pure strategy
equilibrium that emerges in an iterated game when more than one
is possible.55 A convention arises when the players observe some
asymmetry in the state of the world that distinguishes their roles in
the game and begin to play a pure strategy based on the role they
occupy. The most famous and important example of this is the
emergence of the convention of property.6 In particular, Robert
Sugden and Jack Hirshliefer have separately used game theory to
explain David Hume's claim that property is a convention.57 They
posit that, in a state of nature, with no state to enforce property
rights, disputes over particular resources (e.g., a set of firewood)
may be modeled by an iterated Hawk/Dove game. The use of the
iterated Hawk/Dove game is plausible in those cases where (a) the
fighting capabilities of the players are roughly equal (otherwise
there may be a dominant strategy for the better fighter to play
Hawk and the weaker player to play Dove) and (b) the costs of
fighting over the resource are large compared to the value of the
54. Recall the previous point that players in an iterated PD game may need to coordinate
on the means of cooperation, when there is more than one form of cooperation that produces
the Pareto-optimal outcome. See supra text accompanying note 42. Among a population of
nations, the particular form of cooperation that emerges in these circumstances is a
convention.
55. See McAdams, supra note 53, at 2738 (defining a convention as "the coordinated
expectations that sustain a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, in circumstances where multiple
pure-strategy equilibria are possible, and the behavioral regularity that the equilibrium
represents") (emphasis omitted).
56. See JACK HIRSHI IFR, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR IN ADVERSITY 223-34 (1987); BRYAN
SKYRMS, EVOLUrION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 63-79 (1996); ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS
OF RIGHTs, CO-OPERATION, AND WELFARE 55-103 (1986).
57. See HUME, supra note 51, at 490 (stating that property"arises gradually, and acquires
force by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the inconveniences of
transgressing it"); see also Peter Vanderschraaf, The Informal Game Theory in Hume's
Account of Convention, 14 ECON. & PHIL. 215 (1998).
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resource (and hence, the worst outcome for both sides is a Hawk/
Hawk fight)."8
Given these assumptions, each player chooses between three
strategies: (1) to play Dove; (2) to play Hawk; or (3) to "mix" by
playing Dove with probability p and Hawk with probability (l-p).
This third option is called a "mixed strategy." How will the players
behave when the game is repeated? One possibility is what game
theorists call a mixed strategy equilibrium.59 At a mixed strategy
equilibrium, the average player has a value of p such that no one
has an incentive to change his own probability of taking each action.
If this were the end of the story, a property convention would not
exist. Indeed, no convention would exist because it would be
impossible to discern much order from the probabilistic behavior of
each individual in a given iteration.
Suppose, however, that whenever the players are in an iteration
of this Hawk/Dove game, they jointly notice an asymmetry in their
roles. Any persistent factual distinction will suffice to create
different roles. For instance, suppose they notice that one of them
is currently in physical possession of the property and the other one
is not. By itself, this simple observation creates two new possible
strategies contingent on one's role. In addition to the previous three
possibilities, now it is possible to play: (4) Hawk when possessor and
Dove when nonpossessor or (5) Dove when possessor and Hawk
when nonpossessor. °
At first, the existence of these new strategies need not disturb
the mixed strategy equilibrium-the average player still will mix
strategies with the probabilities noted above. Suppose, however,
that at some point a random perturbation, caused by individual
experimentation or a change in the population of players, causes a
small deviation from the mixed equilibrium. If the perturbation
causes the possessor/nonpossessor difference to become correlated
with the strategy played and the players notice this correlation,
then the initial move away from the mixed equilibrium will be self-
reinforcing. Suppose, for example, that it becomes slightly more
58. See HIERSHLEIFER, supra note 56, at 223-34; SUGDEN, supra note 56, at 55-103.
59. See SCHELLING, supra note 37, at 97 n.12.
60. As a final set of possibilities, one could (6) mix by playing strategy (4) with probability
p and strategy (5) with probability (l-p).
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likely than p that nonpossessors will play Dove. Now all players
have a greater incentive to play Hawk when they are the possessor.
In turn, as the probability that the possessor will play Hawk rises
above (l-p), there is a greater incentive to play Dove when one is the
nonpossessor. The shift in strategies will reach a stable point only
when everyone follows the new strategy (4) of playing Hawk when
the possessor and Dove when the nonpossessor. Of course, if the
original perturbation makes it more likely that nonpossessors play
Hawk, the result is the opposite convention where everyone plays
new strategy (5).
The former convention, where nonpossessors defer to possess-
ors, is the property convention. Though nothing guarantees this
convention will arise,6 the theory demonstrates that the social
practice of property can emerge from the repeated interactions of
individuals in a state of nature, without a third-party enforcer
creating or protecting property rights. Significantly, the analysis
does not require that individuals act morally or perceive property as
legitimate. Moreover, as long as every player can perfectly deter-
mine whether she is a possessor or nonpossessor in a given case,
and as long as the game is Hawk/Dove, the property convention (or
its opposite) will eliminate Hawk/Hawk fights.
This analysis is immediately relevant to international relations.
Nations, like individuals, vie for control of territory. When the land
or body of water at issue is especially valuable, each nation may be
better off taking its chances at seizing control by force, with the only
equilibrium being a military conflict. Similarly, when one nation is
far stronger than the other, it may have a dominant strategy of
seizing the territory. But where territory is not especially valuable
compared to the costs of conflict, and where the nations are of
roughly equal power, they may face a Hawk/Dove game with
multiple equilibria. Each nation wants the other to defer to its
territorial claims. The outcome depends on the expectations of the
leaders governing each nation. IfnationA expects that nation B will
play Hawk, then A will want to play Dove; but ifA expects B to play
Dove, A will want to play Hawk. What could produce such expecta-
tions? As with the Hirshleifer-Sugden theory of property, national
61. Sugder, however, argues that the property convention is more likely to arise than is
the opposite convention. See SUGDEN, supra note 56, at 89-91.
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leaders may come to recognize and depend on asymmetries in the
situation that distinguish the roles of the nation. 2 One obvious
possibility is that nations come to expect the possessor of territory
to play Hawk and the nonpossessor to play Dove. With no third-
party enforcer, the nations could arrive at a common practice of
deferring to the possessor, that is, to observe a convention of
territoriality.'
There is no guarantee that the equilibrium that emerges will be
a convention. In the iterated Hawk/Dove game, for example, the
players may each wind up playing a mixed strategy, playing Hawk
with probabilityp and Dove with probability (l-p). If the players do
not use a pure strategy, there is no clear regularity of behavior
based on the role one occupies and no convention. Sometimes a
convention will arise, however, and when it does, it provides a form
of spontaneous order that can prevent Hawk/Hawk fights.
The next question, however, is how well the convention will work
to provide order and avoid conflict. The expectations underlying
conventions will never be coordinated perfectly. Ambiguity in the
convention thus ensures conflict.
2. The Imperfect Nature of Conventions: The Problem of
Ambiguity
The prior section presents conventional behavior in stark terms.
When there is a convention governing in a domain, for example
when first possessors play Hawk, it seems to cover all possible
situations in a straightforward manner. Real world conventions do
not work so effortlessly." Despite the presence of a convention,
there always remains the possibility that a situation will occur in
which the players lack common expectations about what the other
will do. Without common expectations, the players will sometimes
fail to coordinate their behavior.' This section examines how
62. Id at 70-71.
63. Arguably, the convention of deferring to the party in possession is the most likely to
emerge because possessing a territory creates military advantages in conflict over it (e.g.,
better knowledge of the terrain; defense is easier than offense).
64. SeeERICA. POSNER, AWAND SOCIALNORMS 177-79 (2000); Garrett & Weingast, supra
note 34.
65. They may still coordinate by accident. For example, there may be no common
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expectations diverge despite the presence of a convention, in other
words, the imperfection of conventions. There are two basic prob-
lems: (1) the convention itself may be ambiguous because it is based
on a fuzzy asymmetry or there is uncertainty about its complete-
ness; and (2) there is uncertainty about the factual state of the
world that determines how the convention applies."
We illustrate by returning to the territorial convention discussed
above, where repetition of the Hawk/Dove game may produce the
convention of deferring to first possessors. Upon reflection, however,
possession of land is sometimes an ambiguous concept. There may
be no doubt that land is first possessed by a nation if its subjects
are the only group to settle and physically occupy the land. There is
probably no doubt that land is not first possessed by nation A if its
citizens have never seen or visited the land before the citizens of
nation B settle and occupy it (even if, for instance, the citizens of
nation A declared their intent to settle there). In between these
cases, however, are cases where possession is not so clear. When
possession is ambiguous, the roles the players occupy will be
ambiguous, and they may each expect the other to play Dove, with
the result being a Hawk/Hawk conflict. We consider each source of
ambiguity in turn.
a. Conventional Ambiguity
First, the convention itself may be ambiguous. One reason is that
the asymmetry underlying the convention may be fuzzy, at least in
part.67 To give a realistic example using the possession convention,
expectation about whether to drive on the left or the right side of the road, but the drivers
may get lucky and choose the same side.
66. We will illustrate these ambiguities using only one game-the iterated Hawk/Dove
game-though it should be obvious that the same kind of problem will arise in the iterated
PD game, as well as other situations. Recall that a convention in an iterated PD game defines
the particular form of cooperation that emerges when more than one form is possible. See
supra note 42 and accompanying text. The ambiguities explored in this section may produce
different beliefs about whether the acts of a particular nation constitute cooperation or
defection. These differing beliefs can destroy cooperation, as where nation A believes nation
B defected in round n, while nation B believes it cooperated. As a result, A may punish B by
defecting in round n + 1, and expect B to show contrition by continuing to cooperate, but B
may regard A's punishment as a defection requiring B to punish A in round n + 2. The result
is a cascade of defection.
67. This idea follows from the general concept of "fuzzy sets." See, e.g., Claudio A. Cioffi-
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suppose the players notice not only the asymmetry of physical
possession but also a temporal asymmetry, in other words, when
physical possession occurred. The combination of these asymme-
tries, possession and time, produces a more complex set of roles the
players can occupy: not just the (1) current possessor and (2) current
nonpossessor, but also the (3) original possessor and (4) original
nonpossessor. The larger set of possible roles creates a larger set of
possible conventions. One obvious possibility is the familiar idea of
first possession." The common expectation may be that everyone
will play Dove against the original possessor of the firewood, who
will always play Hawk. Perhaps another expectation is that every-
one but the original possessor will play Dove against the current
possessor, who will play Hawk against everyone but the original
possessor.69 In this fashion, national leaders may come to expect
that other national leaders will play Hawk or Dove depending on
the asymmetry of first possession of territory.70
With this more refined convention, now consider a latent
ambiguity. When exactly does territorial possession occur? Suppose
that at time 1, a naval captain from nation A is the first to observe,
chart, and announce a claim to an uninhabited and unclaimed
island. No one from nation A lands on the island. At time 2, a citizen
of nation B lands on the island, plants a national flag, announces a
claim to the island, and then departs. No one from nation B spends
Revilla, Fuzzy Sets and Models of International Relations, 25 AM. J. POL. Scd. 129 (1981).
68. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 73
(1985).
69. We will not detain ourselves with the exact probabilities that this convention will
emerge. We do note that a first possession convention is more efficient than a current
possession convention because the latter diminishes the incentive to invest in property, given
the difficulty of continuously holding it. This efficiency gives the convention a greater
resilience that makes it more likely to persist over time. Others, however, show why efficiency
does not ensure that the convention will emerge or survive over time. See Mahoney &
Sanchirico, Is the Fittest Norm Efficient?, supra note 40, at 2058-63. For this Article's
purposes, all that matters is that the convention is possible, thus illustrating the problem of
ambiguity that plagues conventions.
70. Evolutionary game theory may therefore explain the actual practice of nations in
recognizing the claims of first possession over territory. Again, the point is not that nations
will always comply with the convention-sometimes the territory is so valuable that the game
is not Hawk/Dove, where two equilibria involve the avoidance of conflict, but a PD game in
which conflict is the only equilibrium. However, where the stakes are sufficiently low
compared to the costs of conflict, the game is Hawk/Dove and the convention reflects the
expectations that determine which equilibrium occurs.
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any more time on the island. At time 3, a few citizens of nation C
land on the island, build living quarters and commercial structures,
and make the island their home and trading post. Officials of nation
C announce a claim to the island but otherwise ignore it. At time
4, officials of nearby nation D discover that an island inhabitant
murdered someone on the island, and these officials claim and
exercise jurisdiction over the crime. The resulting trial of murder is
the first formal process any nation carries out for acts that occur on
the island. Now suppose that any two of these nations decide to
begin using the island in a way that is inconsistent with any other
territorial claim. Given the set of expectations constituting a first
possession convention, who will play Hawk and who will play
Dove?71 The ambiguity in possession prevents there from being any
clear expectation about what a given nation will do.72 While the
ambiguity lasts, the nations may fail to coordinate and end up in a
Hawk/Hawk fight.73
The convention may be ambiguous for another reason. Even if the
underlying asymmetry is perfectly clear, it is always potentially
71. If the ambiguity in the roles of original possessor and original nonpossessor were
sufficiently severe, it would be unlikely that any convention would arise based on that
asymmetry. The convention might arise because ninety percent of the time there is a shared
understanding of what nation first possessed a territory, even though there is no shared
understanding about exactly when possession first occurred. This would occur if, ninety
percent of the time, the same nation first observes, plants a flag on, settles, and exercises
criminal jurisdiction over a territory. Thus, even without a sharp understanding of which of
these acts defines possession, if they usually favor the same nation, it may pay for nations to
adopt strategies based on first possession. On the other hand, perhaps ten percent of the time
the concept's application is uncertain because, as in the hypothetical, different nations took
each of the steps associated with first possession.
72. The same is true of possession underlying the property convention among individuals.
As in the famous case of Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805), suppose A hunts
a fox for hours, corners it, and is about to grab hold of it, when B appears out of nowhere and
grabs the fox. Who is the first possessor? If physical grabbing is required for possession, then
B is the first possessor; if some broader concept of control is sufficient, then A is. See Rose,
supra note 68, at 76.
73. There are several possibilities. Nations might attempt to play strategies based on their
differing views of who the first possessor was, which will lead to conflict whenever two nations
believe they are the first possessor. On the other hand, nations might attempt to play a mixed
strategy when they believe the first possessor is ambiguous. There will be a mixed strategy
equilibrium in which a predictable level of conflict will arise when more than two nations
probabilistically select Hawk for a given iteration of the game. Finally, there could be a mix
of these two possibilities in which some nations play strategies based on their view of who the
first possessor was and other nations play mixed strategies. This too would produce conflict.
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incomplete. That is, there may be uncertainty about whether the set
of expectations constituting a convention is subject to exception.
Because there are always more asymmetries than are relevant to
the players' behavior, a question naturally arises: Which asymme-
tries do not matter? We have already seen a possible evolutionary
path the property convention may take: First, the players engage in
strategies based on the asymmetry of possession, then the players
add the further asymmetry of time and play strategies based on first
possession. But would the process stop at two asymmetries? Some
asymmetries seem irrelevant, for example, the weather on the day
the territorial dispute arises. It is difficult, however, to specify in
advance the criteria by which some asymmetries are relevant and
some are not. Without criteria for relevance, there can always be a
divergence of expectations concerning new asymmetries. Every set
of expectations might be subject to an exception based on facts that
have not previously occurred, at least not in the precise combination
now present.
To illustrate, suppose that nation A is the first possessor and
occupier of territory, but its citizens leave the area, and A ceases to
exercise legal jurisdiction over the territory for twenty years. During
this time, the citizens of nation B occupy the land, nation B
announces its claim to the territory, and B's officials begin exercis-
ing legal jurisdiction over it. Suppose A is silent about the territory
for twenty years, but then reasserts its claim, demanding that B
cease to exercise jurisdiction over the territory.
Given the first possession convention, will the nonoriginal
possessor, nation B, play Dove? B will play Dove if it assumes that
the only asymmetries relevant to nation A's behavior are those
embodied in the concept of first possession. It is possible, however,
that the players will take account of another time asymmetry (in
addition to who possessed the territory first), which is how long the
current possessor has been in possession. In other words, it is
possible that the players will adopt more complex strategies that
render incomplete the original description of the convention-that
it always favors first possessors. The convention that eventually
emerges might instead be deference to the first possessor except
when the current possessor has occupied and claimed the territory
for more than, say, twenty years, in which case everyone defers to
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the current possessor. In other words, we may get a convention
similar to what the common law terms adverse possession 74 and
what international law calls acquisitive prescription.5
There is no guarantee, however, that the extended occupancy
exception will arise. As a result, when first possessor A's toleration
of B's twenty-year occupancy initially occurs, or occurs for the first
time within memory, there will be uncertainty about whether the
new asymmetry between the players will matter. The ambiguity of
potential incompleteness is pervasive because new circumstances
are pervasive and they inevitably raise the question of how the old
convention now applies.7' Although repetition may eventually
resolve the ambiguity, conflicting beliefs about the relevance of the
new asymmetry may produce conflict, as each nation plays Hawk
expecting the other to play Dove.77
b. Factual Ambiguity
Even if the convention is perfectly clear, so that everyone expects
the same behavior in a given situation, there may be disagreement
about what the factual situation is. Thus, the second reason
expectations diverge in the presence of a convention is the familiar
problem of imperfect information. Even when the players have
common and precise beliefs about the convention and its complete-
ness, they may make mistakes about the facts that determine
how the convention applies. As a result, the players may harbor
inconsistent beliefs, resulting in inconsistent expectations about
what behavior the convention requires. Regarding territory, nations
74. See Rose, supra note 68, at 79.
75. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 150-56 (5th ed. 1998).
76. Lawyers are familiar with the idea that the facts of two cases are never exactly alike.
As a logical matter, there are an infinite, or at least large, number of circumstances in a
situation that may distinguish the roles of the two players. There is also an infinite or large
number of potential role-defining circumstances that arise for the first time in every conflict.
See Robert Sugden, The Role of Inductive Reasoning in the Evolution of Conventions, 17 LAW
& PHIL. 377 (1998). As a result, there is usually the potential that new circumstances, not
accompanying past Hawk/Dove interactions, might influence how the current Hawk/Dove
interaction will occur.
77. Again, as explained in supra note 73, the players might play pure strategies associated
with what they think is or will be the convention, or they might play mixed strategies. Either
will produce conflict some of the time.
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A and B may jointly adhere to the convention of first possession but
each may believe it is the first possessor. For example, suppose A
and B each believe it is sufficient for establishing first possession of
an uninhabited island that one of its agents was the first to plant a
flag on the island. Suppose, however, the leaders of each country
believe one of their own naval officers was the first to plant a flag on
some island, believing that the other nation was second in time. One
of the two nations is mistaken, but their inconsistent beliefs may
cause each to play Hawk. As with conventional ambiguity, imperfect
information can produce Hawk/Hawk conflict in an iterated
Hawk/Dove game.
C. "Perfecting" Conventions Without Sanctions: Two Forms of
Third-Party Expressive Influence
All of the preceding is background for the claim we now present.
Adjudication works in part by clarifying ambiguity in the underly-
ing conventions players observe, thereby facilitating coordination
between the players.7" The narrower claim is that international
adjudication works primarily for this reason.79 Because interna-
tional adjudicators facilitate coordination by clarifying conventions,
78. This Article contributes generally to the economic analysis of alternative dispute
resolution, that is, of nonstate adjudication mechanisms that lack the power of coercion. The
closest parallel within that literature is Steven Shavell's examination of alternative dispute
resolution. See generally Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic
Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1(1995). Shavell considers how nonbinding adjudication may give
the parties a signal of how their case will be resolved by a full trial. See generally id. We
examine signaling below, but in our theory the signal is not influential because it predicts the
later decision of a central enforcer, but instead because it influences how nations choose their
strategies in the absence of a central enforcer. See also Ian Ayres & Jennifer Brown, Economic
Rationales for Mediation, 80 VA. L. REV. 323 (1994).
79. A few theorists have noted the relevance of coordination to understanding certain
aspects of international treaties. See sources cited supra note 34. Even this literature tends
to ignore the relevance of third parties to coordination, however, focusing instead on how
nations can solve coordination problems through treaty and other inter-party
communications. The only significant attention to third-party influence is in Garrett &
Weingast, supra note 34, at 191-97 (discussing the role of the European Court of Justice in
the integration of the European Community) and Weingast, supra note 42 (discussing GATI
institutions). See also James D. Morrow, The Laws of War, Common Conjecture and Legal
Systems in International Politics, 31 J. LEGAL STuD. 41, 43-48 (2002) (emphasizing the treaty
as the means of resolving ambiguities about how to treat prisoners of war and other laws of
war, but also noting that the Red Cross, a third party, provides information to each side
during war about how the other side treats its prisoners).
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no central enforcer is required. Third-party expression clarifies
conventions and influences behavior in two ways. First, in a coordi-
nation situation, cheap talk construction of a focal point directly
influences expectations without changing payoffs. Second, signals
cause parties to change their beliefs about relevant facts, which
determine what strategy they will choose. Neither point requires
moralistically motivated national leaders nor ideological deference
to legitimate institutionsWs
1. How Third-Party "Cheap Talk" Influences Behavior in
Coordination Games: The Focal Point Theory
One way to influence the behavior of the parties in a game like
Hawk/Dove is to change the payoffs. Legal sanctions, for example,
could transform a Hawk/Dove game into a game with only one
equilibrium representing compliance with the law. Unlike a PD
game, however, changing the payoffs is not the only way to influence
behavior in a Hawk IDovegame. When there are multiple equilibria,
the payoffs are, by definition, insufficient to determine fully the
outcome the players will reach. In other words, with multiple
equilibria, the payoffs may fail to create determinate expectations
among the players about what other players will do. What then
determines these expectations? Game theory is forced to admit that
they might come from just about anything. In particular, nonpayoff
factors create expectations that produce a particular equilibrium.
Our claim is that adjudication works, in part, by expressively
manipulating these nonpayoff influences."'
80. In both cases, we continue the above illustrations involving the iterated Hawk/Dove
game, though the analysis applies to conventions arising from other iterated games.
81. This section elaborates the analysis of Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of
Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000), particularly by focusing it on adjudication.
Garrett and Weingast made a similar claim, and were the first to apply the focal point
analysis to international law. See Garrett & Weingast, supra note 34. As noted above,
however, much of their application to the European Community's internal market requires
signaling rather than cheap talk, yet they provide no signaling theory (as we do below). Other
theorists have briefly noted the importance of focal points to law. See Robert Cooter, Do Good
Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577,
1593-94 (2000); Jonathan R. Hay & Andrei Shleifer, Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A
Theory of Legal Reform, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 398, 400-01 (1998); Eric A. Posner, Law,
Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1719 (1996) (stating that
legislation may provide a focal point); David Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
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a. An Introduction to Cheap Talk and Focal Points
Thomas Schelling's The Strategy of Conflict 2 remains remarkably
relevant after more than four decades, in part because Schelling
focuses on an aspect of game theory that is difficult or impossible to
model mathematically-the selection of equilibrium in a coordina-
tion game. 3 Game theory has since focused on elaborate mathemati-
cal refinements that narrow the possible range of equilibria. But
when the multiplicity of equilibria stubbornly persists, as it often
does, Schelling still has much to say about which one will emerge.'"
Schelling identifies two sources of influence on strategy selection
in a coordination game. First, in the pure coordination game, the
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 910-19 (1996) (explaining that a written constitution
may provide a focal point).
82. SCHELLING, supra note 37.
83. Whether it is impossible or merely difficult is arguable. Schelling claimed that
coordination, via focal points or otherwise, depended "more on imagination than on logic, more
on poetry or humour than on mathematics." Id. at 97. Certainly, it has proved difficult for
game theorists using a rational actor model to describe focal points formally. A few theorists
have recently made the attempt. See Michael Bacharach & Michele Bernasconi, The Variable
Frame Theory of Focal Points: An Experimental Study, 19 GAMES & ECON. BEHAv. 1, 1-5
(1997) (applying the Variable Frame Theory in an attempt to explain the capacity to
coordinate using focal points); Andrew M. Colman, Salience and Focusing in Pure
Coordination Games, 4 J. ECON. METHoDoLOGY 61, 61-63 (1997) (arguing that focal point
selection in pure coordination games are rationally explained by a payoff-dominant form of
reasoning called the Stackleberg heuristic); Robert Sugden, A Theory of Focal Points, 105
ECON. J. 533, 533-35 (1995) (presenting a theory of how labeling of outcomes can influence
decisions in games and attempting to show that focal points can be brought within the scope
of game theory). Others have argued that what is focal cannot be defined merely by
rationality, but requires some psychology. See Sanjeev Goyal & Maarten Janssen, Can We
Rationally Learn to Coordinate?, 40 THEORY& DECISION 29,30 (1996) (arguing that individual
rationality considerations are not sufficient for coordination and that some form of common
background has to be assumed for rational learning to coordinate to take place); Sugden,
supra note 76, at 409-10 (arguing that analysis of inductive learning pattern recognition and
analogy are crucial to an adequate explanation of the social evolution of conventions). Sugden
appears not to believe his prior paper on the subject fully succeeds in explaining the rational
perception of a focal point.
84. See SCHELLING, supra note 37, at 291-303. Indeed, it is the frustration over the
indeterminacy that occurs when there are multiple equilibria, an indeterminacy that makes
cultural and psychological factors relevant, that drives game theorists to search feverishly for
new mathematical ways of eliminating possible equilibria. See AVINASH DIXrT & SUSAN
SKEATH, GAMES OF STRATEGY 213 (1999) (noting that many game theorists "would prefer the
outcome to depend only on an abstract specification of a game" rather than the messy concept
of a focal point).
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players may simply agree on which equilibrium they will reach. If
the question is where A and B will meet, the obvious solution is for
A and B to communicate on the subject.8 5 Later, this kind of
communication became known in game theory as "cheap talk"
because it is not costly to make.' Experiments confirm the intuition
that players who are permitted to use cheap talk prior to playing a
coordination game are therefore more likely to succeed at coordi-
nating. 7
If players cannot communicate or fail to agree," Schelling
identified an alternative mechanism for coordination-focal points.
An equilibrium is focal if it has some feature that draws unique
attention to itself, making it stand out among all equilibria.89 If for
some psychological, historical, or cultural reason, the players are
aware that one equilibrium draws special mental attention from all
the players-is salient to all-that fact alone can cause everyone to
play their strategy associated with that equilibrium.' Such an
equilibrium is selected for no other reason than its uniqueness, if
sufficiently obvious, causing the players to expect others to focus on
it. 9 The resulting expectations are self-fulfilling: Once a player
believes the other players are headed for a particular equilibrium,
the player's best response is to engage in the strategy associated
with that equilibrium.'
The easiest context for illustrating the focal point concept is the
pure coordination game. Suppose you have plans to meet a friend in
85. See SCHELLING, supra note 37, at 91.
86. Talk or communication is "cheap" when it is "costless, nonbinding, and nonveriflable."
DOUGLAS G. BAirD ETAL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAw 303 (1994).
87. See Vincent Crawford, A Survey of Experiments on Communication Via Cheap Talk,
78 J. ECON. THEORY 286, 286-92, 295 (1998) (describing the effect of "cheap talk" on
coordination game experiments).
88. Cheap talk may fail because there is no opportunity to send or receive messages,
because the exchange of messages among all players is too expensive to be worth it, or
because players have conflicting preferences over how to coordinate and reach a bargaining
impasse.
89. See SCHELLING, supra note 37, at 54.
90. See id. at 57-58.
91. See id. at 59.
92. The point is not that every player is certain that others will play the focal strategy
(though they could be), but that as any one player believes it more probable that the others
will play the focal strategy, it becomes more and more in the interest of that player to do so
as well. See id. at 57-58.
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New York City on a particular day, but you failed to agree on a
specific time or place. If you and your friend merely select the time
and place at random among all of the possibilities, the chances of
meeting will be vanishingly small. Yet when Schelling surveyed
some of his Yale colleagues and students, he found that over half
selected the same place, Grand Central Station, and almost
everyone selected the same time, noon.93 In Schelling's terminology,
the equilibrium that emerges, Grand Central Station at noon, is a
focal point." There is something about the nonpayoff features of
this equilibrium that his subjects expected others to find salient. 5
Experiments confirm that, in games of multiple equilibria, salient
non-payoff features (focal points) significantly facilitate coordina-
tion.96
b. Using Third-Party Cheap Talk to Construct a Focal Point
For our purposes, Schelling's most interesting insight combines
cheap talk and focal points. He discusses the ability of a third party,
someone who is not a player in the coordination game, to influence
the players in the game merely by communicating in favor of a
particular outcome. 97 By endorsing a particular outcome in the
common view or hearing of the players, the third party makes that
equilibrium stand out from the rest, which may then create self-
93. Id. at 55 n.1, 56.
94. 1 at 57.
95. See id. at 54, 57-58.
96. See Bacharach & Bernasconi, supra note 83, at 37-39 (describing focal point play's
effects on pure coordination matching games); Judith Mehta et al., An Experimental
Investigation of Focal Points in Coordination and Bargaining: Some Preliminary Results, in
DECISION MAKING UNDER RISKAND UNCERTAINTY: NEw MODELS AND EMPIRICAL FiNDINGS 211,
216 (John Geweke ed., 1992) (finding that players in simple bargaining games with multiple
equilibria are able to achieve coordination by using shared ideas of prominence to lead them
to focal points); Judith Mehta et al., Focal Points in Pure Coordination Games: An
Experimental Investigation, 36 THEORY & DECISION 163, 163-64, 182-83 (1994) (using
experiments to confirm the hypothesis that in coordination games players use salience to
identify focal points on which they can coordinate); Judith Mehta et al., The Nature of
Salience: An Experimental Investigation of Pure Coordination Games, 84 AM. ECON. REv. 658,
672 (1994) (using formal experiments to confirm Schelling's conclusion that use of focal points
increased the success of players in coordination games).
97. Of course the third party is in some larger game. One should ask, what are his
incentives for giving a particular message? The Article addresses this issue below. See infra
notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
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fulfilling expectations that others will play the strategy associated
with that equilibrium. In this way, third-party cheap talk constructs
a focal point.
Consider one of Schelling's illustrations. Suppose that two drivers
approach a busy intersection on different roads. The traffic light is
broken and there is a traffic jam. Each prefers to maintain his or
her speed and have the other driver slow down or stop, but each
realizes that the drivers will collide in the intersection if neither
slows down. Thus, the two drivers are playing a Hawk/Dove game,
similar to the version known as Chicken. In this context, Schelling
observed the likely effect of "the bystander who jumps into an
intersection and begins to direct traffic.' The bystander's sugges-
tions do not change the payoffs because the bystander cannot
sanction drivers for failing to comply. Thus, the drivers continue
to have conflicting interests. Nonetheless, because "coordination
requires the common acceptance of some source of suggestion,' 9 one
suspects that the bystander's suggestion will influence the drivers'
behavior. By calling attention to one outcome, the relevant hand
signals make that outcome focal."°° Experimental studies confirm
Schelling's intuition.'"'
98. SCHELLING, supra note 37, at 144.
99. Id. (emphasis added). Looking to another traffic example, Schelling notes, "[tihe white
line down the center of the road is a mediator, and very likely it can err substantially toward
one side or the other before the disadvantaged side finds advantage in denying its authority."
Id.
100. See id
101. For empirical evidence specific to the context of the Hawk/Dove game, see RICHARD
H. MCADAMS & JANICE NADLER, A THIRD MODEL OF LEGAL COMPLIANCE: TESTING FOR
EXPRESSIVE EFFECTS IN A HAWK/DOVE GAME, 1, 33-34 (Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law, Law
& Economics Working Paper No. 03-14, 2003), available at http'J/www.ssrn.com/
abstract=431782 (describing experimental results showing that the law generates compliance
by inter alia, "facilitating coordination around a focal outcome'). See also Rick K Wilson &
Carl M. Rhodes, Leadership and Credibility in N-Person Coordination Games, 41 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 767, 788-89 (1997) (finding that leaders sending cheap talk messages significantly
improved coordination of their followers in coordination games); IRIS BOHNET & ROBERT
COOTER, EXPRESSIVE LAW: FRAMING OR EQUILmRIUM SELECTION? 1-4 (U.C. Berkeley Law &
Economics Working Paper No. 31- 2001), available at http'J/www.ssrn.com/abstract=452420
(describing the effects of nondeterring penalties in prisoners' dilemma game, crowding game,
and coordination game to demonstrate the power of legal expression to coordinate); J.R. T)ran
& L.P. Feld, Why People Obey the Law: Experimental Evidence from the Provisions of Public
Goods (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
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In this example, there was no prior agreement by the parties to
listen to or obey the bystander. For this reason, we can see that the
focal power of third-party cheap talk does not require such agree-
ment. But we now wish to extend Schelling's analysis to show how
such agreement increases the likelihood of coordination. The ex ante
selection of a third-party "coordinator" endows that individual with
greater power to influence behavior. This is the case for coordination
by design.
To understand this claim, we must focus on the role that common
knowledge plays in the concept of a focal point. What makes an
outcome focal is not merely that it stands out to each individual, but
that each individual believes that it stands out to others, that each
individual believes that each individual believes that it stands out
to others, and so forth. Except by accident, coordination requires
something approaching common knowledge that others will perceive
one equilibrium as unique. In the above example, the third party
was able to create this common knowledge because of two factors:
(1) the message, the bystander's hand signals, was believed to be
sufficiently visible to everyone so that each player was likely to
assume that the other perceived it; and (2) there was no other
competing message, nor any other factor tending to make focal
some other outcome. Both factors are important; uncertainty about
whether others received the third party's message will create
uncertainty about the needed common knowledge; also, competing
messages will create uncertainty about which outcome is most
salient to the other players. Either factor weakens the third party's
behavioral influence.
There is an obvious solution to these two problems. Players could
agree in advance where, or to whom, to look in the event they need
to coordinate. Consider another of Schelling's examples. He noted
that the caller at a square dance will control what the participants
dance, even if they prefer to dance something else.10 2 The dancers
face a mixed motive coordination game because each wants to
coordinate with other dancers, but individuals differ in the dances
they most prefer. Why do they listen to the caller? We think the key
102. See SCHELLING, supra note 37, at 144 ("Mhe participants of a square dance may all
be thoroughly dissatisfied with the particular dances being called, but as long as the caller has
the microphone, nobody can dance anything else.").
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is that the participants agree in advance to who will be the caller.
Even though the expressions of agreement are cheap talk (there
being no externally imposed sanction for those who fail to keep their
promise to obey the caller), the advanced designation of a coordina-
tor gives the designated individual a special ability to influence the
individuals who made the designation. First, the common knowl-
edge that the players identified one person as the coordinator
creates greater certainty that everyone pays attention to what this
individual says. Second, even if everyone pays attention to other
speakers and there is common knowledge of this fact, the designa-
tion of an individual as coordinator makes her message unique
and therefore salient. Thus, a prior cheap talk agreement to select
a coordinator gives that individual greater power to influence the
players via cheap talk.
c. Using Cheap Talk to Clarify Conventions: Resolving
Conventional Ambiguity
To connect the cheap talk discussion to the prior analysis of
conventions,' 3 recall that the ambiguities that plague conventions
are fuzziness and potential incompleteness.' Together, these
ambiguities can lead to Hawk/Hawk conflict. Using cheap talk to
construct a focal point provides one way of overcoming the problem
of conventional ambiguity."
First, cheap talk can clarify a convention by eliminating the
fuzziness of the underlying asymmetry. Recall the discussion of
the property convention based on first possession.' 6 Four countries
might each believe they were the first possessor of an island
territory because one was the first to observe the island, another the
first to plant a flag on it, another to first settle it, and another the
first to exercise legal jurisdiction over it. 7 Now imagine a dispute
between two of these nations, B and C, where B is the first to plant
a flag on the island and C is the first to have citizens occupy it. Just
103. See supra Part II.B.
104. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
105. We defer until later a discussion of how cheap talk might resolve factual ambiguity.
See discussion infra Part II.D.2.
106. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 70-73.
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like the bystander in the road signaling one car to stop and the
other to proceed, a third party who proclaims that one of the nations
is entitled to the island is likely to influence how the players
behave. Specifically, suppose that only one third party speaks on the
issue, or, more likely, only one whom the nations designated in
advance as the coordinator. If the third party states "the territory
belongs to C," then she makes salient the outcome where C plays
Hawk to B's Dove, which tends to create self-fulfilling expectations
that that particular outcome will occur.'
Second, cheap talk can clarify the completeness of a convention.
Recall that uncertainty about what new facts may be relevant to the
strategies of others will impede coordination, and in the Hawk/Dove
game, will lead to conflict." 9 In our territory discussion, we dis-
cussed the potential uncertainty over whether the amount of time
the current occupier had possessed territory mattered to how the
players would behave.110 Specifically, suppose the citizens of nation
A are absent from the territory for twenty years and that the
citizens of nation B now occupy that land. When nation A reasserts
its claim to the territory after twenty years, third-party expression
can again influence behavior merely by creating a focal point. If
the third party states "A is entitled to the territory," or "the first
possessor retains his interest in land unless she allows others to
control it without objection for more than forty years," or both, then
she makes focal the outcome where A plays Hawk to B's Dove.
Again, the resulting expectations tend to be self-fulfilling. For both
types of ambiguity, the third party's statement works to resolve the
dispute without a Hawk/Hawk conflict.
It should be fairly obvious that the process just described is the
"law" part of adjudication. Sharpening the definition and clarifying
the completeness of a convention are what a court does when it
108. If the third party instead states "possession of a territory does not occur until a nation
physically occupies and settles a previously uninhabited and unclaimed land," she is likely
to have influenced the outcome to the same effect. This statement directly addresses only the
convention and not the particular dispute, but B and C are each likely to infer that the
clarification favors C and therefore are more likely to reach the outcome where C plays Hawk
and B plays Dove. If B and C then comply with the third-party statement, we can imagine
that the precedent of that outcome indirectly clarifies the convention in future cases, that is,
that future parties in the same position will expect the party in C's position to play Hawk.
109. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
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carefully articulates the legal rule in a case of first impression.
What we are adding here is an understanding of how the court,
merely by this process of clarification, can influence behavior. Like
the bystander in the intersection, the third party who points to and
makes salient one particular means of cooperating is likely to create
self-fulfilling expectations that each player will select the strategy
associated with that outcome. One of the players will want to resist
the third party's suggestion that she play Dove, but the third party's
cheap talk expression may cause her to do so anyway, because that
expression has now made that outcome focal."1
2. How Third-Party Signaling Influences Behavior in Iterated
Coordination Games: The Informational Theory
Sometimes a third party may issue messages that are not cheap
talk, but signals. In this section, we argue that signaling provides
third parties with a second expressive means of influencing the
behavior of individuals in a coordination game. Given imperfect
information, third parties can influence behavior by expressions
that signal their private information about the state of the world."
We begin with a banal illustration of signaling: the messages a
referee sends in an informal game of soccer. By informal, we mean
that the referee has no sanctioning power; the teams are not part of
111. The same may be said of other coordination situations including those modeled by the
iterated PD game where there is more than one way to cooperate. As discussed above, supra
Part II.B.2.a, there may be ambiguities in the conventions that define cooperation and
defection, caused by fuzzy boundaries or potential incompleteness. Cheap talk may make one
particular definition focal, thereby clarifying the convention and aligning the players'
expectations about future rounds. For example, two nations might each agree by treaty to
solve a social dilemma by restricting fishing in some way. Despite best efforts, the treaty may
contain terms with fuzzy boundaries or potential incompleteness about possible exceptions.
Third-party cheap talk may maintain cooperation by clarifying the boundaries and the
exceptions.
112. The closest analyses to this Article's are Shavell's, as explained supra note 78, and
Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, The Condorcet Jury Theorem and the
Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 1 (2003).
Dharmapala and McAdams examine signaling as a source of compliance with legislative
enactments, independent of sanctions leading to deterrence. Id. at 2-3. The model of
legislative aggregation of information, however, is not appropriate for adjudication, especially
by single individuals. They also emphasize information that influences one's personal well-
being directly, such as the harms of secondhand smoke, rather than information useful for
discerning or applying a convention. Id. at 4.
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a formal league that punishes players for failing to obey the referee.
One might wonder why competitors would even bother having a
referee who lacks the ability to enforce his decisions. The answer is
signaling.
Players on opposing teams share expectations defined by the
rules of the game. Whether soccer is modeled as iterated Hawk/Dove
or PD game, rule enforcement derives from the behavior of the
players in the game, who will threaten some costly conflict or
sanction (such as fighting, gossip, or quitting the game) if the other
team tries to claim or deny a goal contrary to the rules. To a
significant degree, this second-party enforcement works. Sometimes,
however, the players disagree about the governing facts. For
example, they may disagree about whether, in a particular case, the
ball crossed the line in front of the net. In these cases, each side
might believe the other is trying to cheat, and the resulting
sanctioning behavior could make both sides worse off.
This is the problem that signaling ameliorates. A third party can
signal what she believes the state of the world is (e.g., whether the
ball crossed the line). To take an extreme case, suppose that a
bystander with a digital camera photographs the moment when the
goalie falls in front of the kicked ball, and that digital image reveals
that the ball clearly crossed the line. We can easily imagine that
this image, provided by a third party, would cause the players to
update their beliefs about the relevant events. To a lesser degree, a
referee provides the same service, at least if the players believe her
to be sufficiently accurate, meaning that she is perceptive and
unbiased. Hearing what the referee thought happened, players will
"update" their beliefs in the direction of the referee's. At least in
close cases, players who initially disagree with the referee may come
to agree with her, or at least to be in sufficient doubt of their own
beliefs, that they defer to the other team. As a result, the game can
continue and both teams are better off.
Return now to an example of the iterated Hawk/Dove game in
which imperfect information causes nations A and B to each believe
it is the first possessor of an island territory. The source of the
disagreement is factual. The leaders of A and B each believe that
one of her naval captains was the first to plant a national flag on the
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island. One of the two nations is mistaken, but their inconsistent
beliefs may cause each to play Hawk, producing serious conflict.
Consider that national leaders, knowing that information is
imperfect, may adopt strategies accounting for the possibility of
mistake. We will not discuss all of the various possibilities. The key
is that national leaders are still likely to play some strategy that is
sensitive to their perception about the state of the world. One might
play Hawk when she believes the state of the world, more likely
than not, favors her (in other words, makes her nation the first
possessor under the relevant convention) or play Dove otherwise.
Alternatively, a leader might play Hawk with certainty only when
she is more than X% confident that the state of the world favors her,
mix Hawk and Dove with certain probabilities if she is between X%
and Y% certain, or play Dove with certainty if she is less than Y%
certain. Or she might play Hawk and Dove with probabilities that
are a continuous function of her level of confidence that the state of
the world favors her.
Given any such strategy, new evidence about the state of the
world can influence the strategies selected by causing the players to
update their beliefs about the world. One type of new evidence will
be the stated views of a third party. As a simple example, suppose
the two national leaders each use a strategy sensitive to whether
they believe it is more or less than 50% likely that the relevant
facts-when each captain planted the flag-favor their nation.
Suppose the issue is a close one and that leader A believes her
captain planted the first flag with a 55% probability while leader B
believes her captain planted the first flag with a 55% probability.
Thus, if nothing changes, the nations will each insist on getting
their way and the result will be a Hawk/Hawk clash that each
regrets. But if a third party, believed by both sides to be perceptive
and unbiased, announces that A's captain planted the first flag, the
leaders ofA and B may update their beliefs, so that B now believes
it more than 50% likely that A's claim occurred first and therefore
defers to A's insistence on the territory.
To cause individuals to update their beliefs about the state of the
world, the third party must provide what is taken to be independent
evidence of what actually happened. Two elements are necessary for
the third party to provide this independent evidence: ability and
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motive. To be able to signal, the third party must have private
information about the relevant state of the world. In the soccer
example, a bystander had such private information in the form of
his own photographic evidence. It is also private information,
however, if an individual reviews the existing evidence provided by
the parties, such as evidence of when the two captains planted their
flags, and evaluates it with her own unique experience and perspec-
tive.
To be motivated to signal, the third party must have an incentive
to reveal her actual beliefs about what she observes, that is, to
signal her beliefs. This requires that she would incur some costs for
failing to speak or for speaking something other than what she
actually believes. A possible cost is the loss of future opportunities
to serve as an adjudicator.13 That is, we assume that a third party
expects to receive some benefit for acting as an adjudicator, whether
it be money, prestige, influence, or something else. We also assume
that the greater the third party's reputation for accuracy, the
greater her opportunity for being hired as an adjudicator.114 If so,
then an adjudicator will want to adopt a strategy that maximizes
her chances that players will ask her to serve as an adjudicator
again in the future. As explained further below, players will only
agree to accept an adjudicator who appears to be accurate, meaning
perceptive and unbiased. Players will measure accuracy by the
disparity between their beliefs and what an adjudicator signals.
Although different people will see things differently, an adjudicator
who actually believes that she observed state of the world X can
minimize the disparity in her signals and what others believe by
signaling X. Even if she is not highly confident of X, her belief that
X occurred means it is more likely that the average belief among the
players is X rather than something else. Therefore, she will want to
express what she actually believes.
113. One could also assume that the third party gains utility from expressing her actual
beliefs.
114. Accuracy creates opportunity in both a relative and an absolute sense. First, third
parties will compete against each other for the job of adjudicator; disputants will hire those
who are the most accurate relative to others. Second, the disputants will insist on a certain
absolute level of accuracy, for reasons explained more fully below. In general, disputants will
pay more for a signal they believe is more accurate because the stronger the third party's
reputation for accuracy, the more likely the disputants will update their beliefs in response
to a signal, creating a greater chance at avoiding conflict.
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Given this motive, the third party's statement of the state of the
world is a signal of her private information. Her statement works
like the photographic evidence, though in most cases the influence
over the beliefs of the players would be weaker. Nonetheless, in
some circumstances even a small degree of updating of national
leaders' beliefs may change the strategy they play. 15 Because the
national leaders update their beliefs in the same direction, they may
develop more common beliefs about who will play Hawk, with the
result that a Hawk/Hawk clash is averted.
In sum, in iterated coordination games, third-party expression
can influence the behavior of nations in at least two ways. First,
cheap talk can clarify ambiguities in the convention, due to
fuzziness and potential incompleteness. Second, signals can clarify
ambiguities in the facts. In the former situation, nations select
strategies based in part on what they expect other nations to do, and
cheap talk construction of a focal point can directly influence those
expectations. In the latter situation, nations select strategies based
on their beliefs about the state of the world and signaling can
influence those beliefs. Neither effect requires that the third
party be able to impose sanctions on a noncomplying nation, nor
that national leaders recognize the moral authority of legitimate
adjudication.
Figure 3 provides a graphic illustration of the theory. When the
third party clarifies ambiguities in a convention, resolving its
fuzziness or potential incompleteness, she acts like a common law
court by stating the law as it applies to the case. When the third
party reviews evidence of the facts and articulates her view of them,
she is acting like a court by finding the facts. Before applying the
theory to international adjudication, however, some extensions are
necessary to answer some possible objections.
115. The same can be said in the context of conventions arising out of other games, such
as an iterated PD game. For example, two nations might agree by treaty to limit their fishing
in certain waters, but there might arise a factual dispute about whether one of the nations
has complied with the limits. If so, then a third-party signal might cause the relevant actors
in each nation to update their beliefs in the same direction, thereby creating common beliefs
that prevent cooperation from unraveling.
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Figure 3: Overview of the Expressive Theory of
Adjudication
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D. The Demand for Expressive Adjudication and the Synergy
Between Cheap Talk and Signaling
To explain fully how adjudication works expressively, we need to
address two more questions. First, having described how expressive
adjudication can influence the behavior of disputants, the question
remains whether disputants would want to be so influenced. Absent
a central enforcer to compel a nation to adjudicate, the process
requires the consent of both parties. Will disputants consent to
expressive adjudication? Second, we have explained cheap talk as
a solution to ambiguities in conventions (caused by fuzziness and
potential incompleteness) and signaling as a solution to ambiguities
in the facts that determine how conventions apply. A natural
question is whether cheap talk can also solve problems of factual
ambiguity and whether signaling can also solve problems of
conventional ambiguity. If so, are both components strictly neces-
sary to the theory, or is one redundant to the other? This section
addresses these issues together, contending that both components
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are necessary, and, indeed, that the synergy of cheap talk and
signaling induces disputants to seek out both.
1. The Demand for Adjudication (and the Need for Signaling)
Absent a central enforcer to coerce nations into a process of
adjudication, the parties must agree to submit their dispute to the
adjudicator. Otherwise, one or more of the nations might act
preemptively before the adjudicator announces its decision, refuse
to cooperate with the adjudicative process, or somehow commit itself
to ignoring the adjudicator's expression. Consequently a critical
question is whether the parties will be motivated to submit their
dispute to adjudication.
One part of the answer should be immediately apparent. When
third-party expression facilitates coordination, it benefits the
players-at least ex ante, which is what matters for inducing
consent to adjudication. In an iterated Hawk/Dove game, expressive
adjudication raises the expected payoffs for each player by eliminat-
ing the possibility of a mutually destructive Hawk/Hawk outcome.
To illustrate, assume players interact in the Hawk/Dove game in
Figure 4 below. Without anything to make either equilibrium focal,
game theory predicts that players will use a mixed strategy, playing
Dove with probabilityp (where 0 <p < 1) and Hawk with probability
(l-p). Given the payoffs of this matrix and assuming risk neutrality,
the mixed strategy equilibrium occurs where p = 1/3.116 For each
player, the expected value of the game at this equilibrium is 2/3, or
.67.117 This payoff includes a 4/9 chance of the costly Hawk/Hawk
outcome. If, however, the two players designate a third party to
randomly select one player to play Hawk and the other Dove, and
they follow this cheap talk message, the expected outcome is now
2.11s The third party thus creates an expected gain of 1 and 1/3 for
116. One solves for p by determining at what value the expected payoffs for playing Hawk
equal the expected payoffs for playing Dove.
117. One determines the expected payoffs for one round of the game by multiplying the
equilibrium probability of each of the four outcomes by its value and summing the results.
118. Each player expects to receive the favored message, i.e., be told to play Hawk, with
probability of 12, giving each player a 50% chance of playing Hawk against Dove (valued at
4) and a 50% chance of playing Dove against Hawk (valued at 0). Ayres & Brown, supra note
78, use this effect of randomization to explain mediation.
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each player. By creating a focal point via cheap talk, the third party
eliminates the possibility of a Hawk/Hawk clash. This point is
crucial because it suggests that players in a coordination game, even
one with conflict, will have an incentive to seek the expression of
third parties.
Figure 4
Dove Hawk
Dove 2 4
2 0
Hawk 0 -1
4 -1
This analysis makes explicit one feature of cheap talk that until
now remained implicit-that it has to give each side a roughly equal
chance to win. To be attractive to the parties to a dispute, the
content of cheap talk messages needs to be more or less random. If
instead, A and B believe that C will, for example, designate A as the
winner in 90% of disputes, then for most payoffs (including Figure
4),119 B would not agree ex ante to designate C as the adjudicator.
Choosing a third-party adjudicator is itself a coordination game, one
that parties engaged in hard bargaining might not solve. But there
is an obvious focal solution in selecting a cheap talk adjudicator:
pick one who is 50% likely to give a message favorable toA and 50%
likely to give a message favorable to B." When the players require
119. For Figure 4, we originally noted that each player expects to receive a payoff of .67 at
the mixed strategy equilibrium and a payoff of 2 from an unbiased third party who gives each
player a 50% chance of playing Hawk against Dove. But if the third party gives A a 90%
chance of playing Hawk against Dove and gives B a 10% chance, then B expects a payoff of
.4 (10% chance of 4 and a 90% chance of 0). Thus, B would prefer the mixed strategy to the use
of this biased third party.
120. The possibility of a 50/50 split makes this game of selecting an adjudicator much
easier to resolve than the underlying Hawk/Dove game. The 50/50 split is a natural focal
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a cheap talk solution, they are most likely to agree in designating an
adjudicator when they perceive her to give each an equal chance of
winning."'
Now we can introduce an important strategic limitation to cheap
talk: Disputes are endogenous to the method of dispute resolution.
Thus, if players accept randomized cheap talk as a solution to
conventional or factual ambiguity, then they will encourage others
to create bad faith disputes, when they pretend there is a conven-
tional or factual ambiguity in order to win a 50% chance of the
matter in dispute. With such a large chance of winning any dispute,
a nation will claim to be the first possessor by asserting expecta-
tions it does not actually hold. For example, a nation that first
discovered but never occupied or claimed a territory will assert,
contrary to the facts, that it believes the settled expectations are
that first discovery determines first possession. 2 Even if the
conventional claim is entirely absurd, such as "we should win the
territory because in French our nation's name is spelled with fewer
letters," the prospect of a random solution gives a nation the
incentive to make the claim. Our initial analysis of cheap talk
omitted this problem because there we used examples with genuine
fuzziness in the factual asymmetry defining the players' roles and
genuine uncertainty about possible exceptions to the convention.
Given a random solution, however, players will invent bad faith
disputes. Because of this strategic problem, no nation will want to
point, where there is no natural focal point in the Hawk/Dove game (at least not in cases of
conventional or factual ambiguity).
121. That the players require a cheap talk message chosen more or less at random raises
another question: If randomization is desired, why don't the players bypass the third party
adjudicator and use some arbitrary device like a coin flip to give them each an equal chance
at resolving the dispute in their favor? The players could agree to endow a random event, like
a coin landing heads up or tails up, with the message of "A wins' or "B wins." It may appear
that third-party cheap talk is unnecessary, because coin flipping is cheaper. As explained in
the text, however, third parties are needed for signaling. Because players will not agree
whether they need signaling or cheap talk, they will instead leave the task of randomizing to
the third party once she determines that there is nothing to signal.
122. As another example, even though past play produces settled expectations that
occupying land cannot supercede the rights of the first possessor in fewer than twenty years,
a nation who has occupied the land for ten years may claim that it believes that time period
is commonly understood to be sufficient.
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use randomized cheap talk to resolve all conventional or factual
disputes.1
23
This strategic problem reveals the necessity of signaling. As
discussed above, signaling can resolve conflict arising from factual
ambiguity by causing players to update their beliefs. Note that
signaling can have this effect despite the strategic problem just
identified. Because the players believe the third party will signal his
usually accurate belief about the facts, they will believe that a
player raising a bad faith dispute, one that is contrary to his
actual beliefs, will have a poor chance of prevailing. The higher the
confidence a nation has that the relevant state of the world favors
it, the higher its confidence that it will prevail before an accurate
adjudicator. For example, when describing the strategic problem, we
noted that if cheap talk were random, then a player would assert
the existence of an ambiguity even when the facts were entirely
clear. But when the facts are entirely clear, the third party will
perceive as much, and with near certainty she will signal in favor of
the party favored by the clear facts. It is precisely because signals
are not random, but rather are correlated with the third party's
view of the state of the world, that signaling can overcome the
strategic problem.
Of course, an adjudicator will make some factual errors. If there
were no cost to seeking adjudication, then players would still bring
bad faith disputes, claiming to believe facts they do not actually
believe for the purpose of benefitting from an adjudicative error,
however small. Adjudication does, however, impose costs on the
players such as lost time and the adjudicator's fees. Given such
costs, players will prefer to avoid adjudication if the chances of
winning are too low, which they will be when the player realizes
the facts clearly favor the other player. Thus, the availability of
adjudication need not create new disputes or not so many as to
outweigh the advantage of adjudication. Within plausible parame-
ters, when the convention actually creates consistent expectations,
123. Various other strategies seem possible. One is to forgo all cheap talk adjudication.
Another possible strategy is to use one's own level of certainty over the convention or facts to
determine whether to seek cheap talk. Thus a nation that believes it has the right to the
territory, based on the convention and facts, might agree to a cheap talk adjudication if it is
onlyX% to Y% sure of its claim, but not if it is more than Y% sure. In any event, there will be
plenty of occasions when one side or the other refuses to seek out third-party cheap talk.
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the player expected to play Dove will do so rather than incur the
cost of obtaining an adjudicative signal that will not favor her.
Only when the conventional ambiguities actually create divergent
expectations, in other words, when each party expects the other to
play Dove, will each be willing to incur the cost of adjudication.
Indeed, the cost of adjudication is attractive because the willingness
to adjudicate identifies the case as one that, without adjudication,
is likely to produce a Hawk/Hawk outcome.
To illustrate using the payoffs of Figure 4, assume that the error
rate is 10% and the cost of adjudication for each party is 1. Suppose
that national leaders of A and B each believe that A is the first
possessor and thereby the party entitled to the territory under the
existing expectations. Would B pretend to believe otherwise in order
to force an adjudication? No, because the cost of adjudication of 1 is
greater than the expected gain of .4 (a 10% chance of winning 4). If
B is not willing to engage in adjudication, then A can be confident
that B is going to play Dove. A would ignore B's cheap talk state-
ments to the contrary. Conversely, if B is willing to incur the costs
of adjudication, then its talk of playing Hawk is no longer cheap; B
is now signaling a genuine intent to play Hawk. IfA intends to play
Hawk and discerns that B is likely to play Hawk as well, then A will
prefer to adjudicate. Because B's incentives are the same, B will also
want to adjudicate. Given two parties willing to adjudicate, the
prospect of a Hawk/Hawk outcome without adjudication looms large
and is even more probable than in the mixed strategy equilibrium.
In sum, if a third party's signal is sufficiently accurate by being
perceptive and unbiased, then only those who believe the convention
entitles them to play Hawk will want to bear the costs of adjudicat-
ing. At the same time, being willing to bear those costs is a signal
that one truly intends otherwise to play Hawk, so mutual willing-
ness to incur the costs of adjudication identifies the dispute as one
for which a Hawk/Hawk outcome is likely in the absence of adjudi-
cation. In this situation, each party expects to gain by adjudicating.
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2. The Need for Cheap Talk (and Why Adjudicators Do Not
Distinguish Their Signals from Their Cheap Talk)
Originally, we discussed signaling only as a solution to factual
ambiguity, but signaling also works to resolve disputes based on
apparent disagreement over the content of the convention due to
fuzziness and potential incompleteness. If settled expectations
underlying a convention are entirely clear and not fuzzy, then this
is also a fact the third party can signal. For example, if a nation
claims that possession occurs at discovery rather than occupation,
and this clearly contradicts existing expectations among nations of
the world, then a third party need not randomize between the
parties, but instead will signal that existing expectations treat
possession as occupation. Similarly, if expectations are settled about
the absence of a particular exception to a convention because the
convention is complete, then this, too, is a fact a third party can
signal. Even though the adjudicator will occasionally err, as with
factual disputes, players may have the incentive to seek adjudica-
tion of all convention-based disputes.
At this point, however, one must ask what cheap talk contributes
to the expressive theory of adjudication. If signaling can work for
resolving disputes caused by ambiguity in the convention, is cheap
talk useful? The answer is straightforward: Cheap talk is needed
whenever the factual or conventional issue is so close that the
adjudicator has nothing to signal. In certain circumstances, the
exact contours of the convention or the factual state of the world will
be so difficult to determine that signaling will fail to prevent fact-
based conflict. In these cases, cheap talk can succeed.
To illustrate by returning to the soccer example, suppose two
soccer teams appoint an informal referee prior to their game. In the
game, there is a scoring dispute about whether the ball crossed the
line in front of one team's goal. Suppose that the referee could not
tell whether the ball had crossed the line. Signaling her indecision,
she states that it was too close to call. The statement signals her
belief that it is close to 50% likely that the ball crossed the line and
close to 50% likely that it did not. The problem here is that it is
extremely unlikely that the statement will avert conflict. If players
on both teams believe it is more than 50% likely that the state of the
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world favored their position, they will probably continue to believe
as much after the signal, though perhaps with slightly less confi-
dence. The point is general: Whenever the third party cannot signal
conclusively about the particular outcome, the weak signal is likely
to fail to change beliefs sufficiently to avert conflict.
The signal of indecision, however, does accomplish something
very important. If the third party is perceptive and unbiased, her
indecision makes it very likely that the factual dispute is genuine
rather than strategic. If the dispute were in bad faith, it is not likely
that the adjudicator would find the underlying issue too close to call.
Thus, when the third party signals indecision, the probability that
the dispute is in bad faith is very low. It is precisely in this context
that the players can benefit by resolving their conflict by some
process of randomization. One way to randomize is to permit the
third party to randomize and then announce the results by a cheap
talk message informing one party to play Hawk and the other to
play Dove.
To continue the soccer illustration, assume that the informal
referee follows this strategy: (1) when she believes that the ball
crossed the line in front of Team A's net, she will say "Team B
scored"; (2) when she believes that the ball did not cross the line in
front of Team A's net, she will say "Team B did not score"; and (3)
when she does not know whether the ball crossed the line, she will
say "too close to call. I couldn't tell." As previously stated, messages
(1) and (2) can influence the players' behavior under a signaling
theory. The third message influences behavior by identifying those
cases when teams can agree to randomize without fear of exploita-
tion. It therefore makes it more likely that the teams will agree to
use a randomizing device to resolve their dispute. Stated differently,
when Team A believes it has scored and Team B disputes it, each
team might adopt this strategy: (1) if the referee rules in our favor,
play Hawk; (2) if the referee rules against us, play Dove; and (3) if
the referee claims not to know, then randomize. 4
124. More complex strategies are possible. A team might, for example, agree to randomize
only if the referee claims not to know and the team is between 50% and 75% certain of
whether the goal scored, but to play Hawk if the referee claims not to know and the team is
more than 75% certain that it scored. The point is simply that the third-party signal can
substantially increase the situations in which the players will agree to use randomization.
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One way to randomize is to allow the third party to randomly
select a cheap talk message. Thus, suppose the referee follows the
strategy that includes rules (1) and (2) above (ruling in favor of the
relevant team when the facts are clear), but modifies the third rule
to the following: (3) when she does not know whether the ball
crossed the line, she will randomly select between the messages of
(1) and (2). Thus, she never says that she is uncertain of the
outcome, but when she is, she randomizes on her own and simply
announces a substantive outcome, either that the goal is good or
that it is not. From the two teams' perspectives, it does not matter
whether they randomize or the third party does. Obeying a referee
who follows this three-part strategy is no different than obeying a
referee who follows the previous three-part strategy, which differed
only because she discloses when she is uncertain. In either case, the
teams will win all disputes when the referee believes their view of
the facts, will lose all disputes when the referee believes the other
side's view of the facts, and will win 50% of the disputes when the
referee is undecided. Thus, cheap talk and signaling work synergis-
tically.
One final point is that most adjudicators, including referees,
never admit their indecision and never explicitly randomize.
Regardless, this theory can still explain adjudication. As noted
above, we assume that third parties compete for the job of adjudica-
tor, for prestige, money, or something else, and this competition
drives them to reveal their actual beliefs. Consider this exception,
however: Even if the players authorize the adjudicator to randomize
in the face of her indecision, the adjudicator might prefer to conceal
actual indecision. There is, of course, the idea external to game
theory that an adjudicator's decisions might enjoy greater obedience
via some kind of legitimacy only if they reflect the adjudicator's
actual judgment, rather than randomization; however, we offer a
rational choice explanation. For factual disputes, players desire
accurate adjudicators (referees). The need for the adjudicator to
project accuracy creates an incentive to conceal her failure to form
a determinative belief, that is, to conceal the fact that she had to
randomize. In the soccer context, a referee who has to resort to
randomization twenty times a game will seem less competent than
a referee who has to resort to randomization only five times a game,
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all other things being equal. Even though everyone knows there are
some calls that are too close for anyone to determine, those compet-
ing to be referees will understandably engage in a race to the
bottom, where the bottom means the referee claims never to require
randomization because, in every case, she has actually determined
the relevant facts.
25
For reasons similar to those just noted about facts, cheap talk will
also work, despite the strategic problem, when the convention is
genuinely ambiguous; in other words, when a convention actually
does embody fuzzy asymmetries or remains potentially incomplete,
then the adjudicator can influence behavior by clarifying it. As an
illustration, we described the problem of when first possession
occurs. This type of case represents a legal question of first impres-
sion. As such, there are no settled expectations and therefore
nothing for the adjudicator to signal other than indecision. 126 At the
same time, the conflict that arises in these cases is not strategic: as
long as the adjudicator will signal when expectations are settled,
then the players will benefit from following the adjudicator's cheap
talk when expectations are unsettled. Thus, when the dispute arises
because of genuine ambiguity in the convention, cheap talk is the
only form of expression that can influence the parties. Again,
however, cheap talk works here only because the players believe the
adjudicator will signal when she has a definite belief about the
relevant expectations.
To answer the questions posed at the outset of this section: (1)
both signaling and cheap talk uniquely contribute to the expressive
125. One might object that an individual cannot really randomize without referring to an
external object like a coin or die, which would then reveal what the referee wishes to conceal.
Referees in these situations, however, do not literally randomize. More likely, they alternate,
so that the first tie goes to Team A, the second to Team B, the third back to Team A, and so
forth. From the team's perspective, what makes randomizing work is that each of two teams
has an equal expected value, which is also true of this nonrandom alternating pattern as long
as there is no way to determine which team will be given the benefit of the first tie. This
description also fits what many sports fans suspect of many actual referees. The same might
be true of legal adjudicators.
126. For simplicity, we have omitted a final possible factor. Some conventions maybe more
efficient than others. Where there are no settled expectations, the players may prefer that the
adjudicator select the convention that maximizes joint welfare. This is likely when the players
expect the ruling to apply to them in the future and do not know which role they will then
occupy. We leave this complication for subsequent work, because incorporating efficiency
concerns will not affect the basic claim of this Article.
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power of adjudication, and (2) disputants will benefit from seeking
out expressive adjudication. When an adjudicator forms a decisive
belief about the expectations defining a convention or about the
facts the convention makes relevant, then the adjudicator can
influence the behavior of the players by signaling her belief. When
an adjudicator, after considering the relevant evidence, remains
indecisive about the convention or facts, then she can influence the
behavior of the players by providing cheap talk. Without signaling,
the strategic problem creates a strong disincentive for players to
comply with cheap talk. Without cheap talk, signaling will fail
whenever the adjudicator is unable to signal a strong belief about
the disputed facts or convention. With the combination of cheap talk
and signaling, however, each party is better off ex ante by seeking
adjudication. Not only does each function where the other does not,
but signaling identifies the cases where cheap talk can work.
We offer the above theory to explain how international adjudica-
tion works in a world without legal sanctions. One should note,
however, the generality of the theory: The expressive account
explains the expressive power of any adjudication. In addition, the
expressive theory is useful for explaining the origins of adjudication.
We noted above how the judiciary in medieval Iceland announced
decisions but left enforcement to the parties themselves. Such a
result should be perplexing given a theoretical focus on sanctions,
but cheap talk and signaling are sufficient to explain why the
decisions of Icelandic courts generated compliance.
Before moving to the empirical analysis, this Article addresses a
final theoretical point: the conditions under which adjudication will
fail to work expressively.
E. The Limits of Expression and the Need for Legal Sanctions
Having identified the expressive power of adjudication, we must
now emphasize that our theory has a limited domain and that
outside that domain, compliance continues to depend upon sanctions
or other factors. In addition, even within the relevant domain the
prior analysis implicitly identifies a number of conditions necessary
for expression to influence behavior.
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The domain of our expressive theory is a game involving coordina-
tion between multiple equilibria. Some games have just one
equilibrium, in which case the payoffs alone determine how the
players will behave, and the expressive effects we have identified
will not apply. In the context of international relations, there are
two common situations that are likely to represent a single equilib-
rium game impervious to expressive influences. First, severe
inequalities of power may create situations where the only equilib-
rium is that the strong nation wins the dispute. The strong nation's
best strategy may be to act aggressively and take the resource at
issue regardless of what the weak nation does. If so, then mere
expression will not change the outcome. Second, even between two
nations of roughly equal power, if the dispute involves very high
stakes for one or both nations, the only equilibrium may be conflict.
If one or both of the two nations in the game perceive that losing the
disputed resource would destroy its economy, then one or both
nations may prefer to act aggressively no matter what the other one
does. One or both may be better off bearing the costs of conflict and
having some chance of winning the resource, rather than deferring
to the other and having no chance of winning.
The Hawk/Dove game represents neither the situation of power
imbalance nor high stakes. The Hawk/Dove game arises most
commonly because two nations of roughly equal power compete over
some low or moderate stakes resource. In this circumstance, the
expected cost of conflict exceeds the expected benefits of winning the
resource, so the worst outcome for both is a Hawk/Hawk clash.
Again, this game models common situations, but certainly far less
than all situations of conflict.
Even within the domain in which expression potentially resolves
conflict, there is no guarantee that it will resolve conflict. For
signaling and cheap talk to function, there needs to be some third
party that the two nations each regard as unbiased and as possess-
ing the necessary expertise. Obviously, this will not always be the
case. For signaling, the nations must not be too confident in their
beliefs about the state of the facts or the state of the convention. If
they are, then even though each nation will consent to adjudication,
it is unlikely that the loser in adjudication will update its beliefs
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sufficiently to change the strategy it will play. Nevertheless, in
many cases adjudication can be effective.
We now turn to the evidence supporting our thesis: That when
the specified conditions exist, international adjudication exerts
expressive influence on state behavior.
III. APPLYING THE MODELS: THE EXPRESSIVE EFFECT OF
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
This Part discusses how interstate dispute resolution exploits the
power of third parties to influence outcomes in coordination games.
Section A briefly reviews the history of third-party involvement in
the resolution of disputes between nations. Section B then provides
three case studies drawn from dispute resolution prior to the
establishment of the ICJ in 1946, demonstrating how the signaling
and focal point models usefully explain the various functions being
served. Section C turns specifically to the ICJ, describing and
explaining countries' compliance with the court's decisions. Our
comprehensive review of the ICJ docket reveals that the court
receives a wide variety of types of claims. The disputes the court
resolves, however, include a large number of what are essentially
international property disputes that can be resolved either by
providing a signal of the state of the world or clarifying the underly-
ing international conventions. This theory thus explains which
disputes are ultimately resolved by the court and how the court
resolves them.
A. A Brief History of Interstate Dispute Resolution
Interstate dispute resolution originated in ancient times.127 It was
particularly well developed in the form of arbitration among the
ancient Greek city-states.2 8 The Greeks attributed the origin of
arbitration to the gods of Olympia, whose interactions paralleled the
relations among city-states.' 2 Arbitration was sometimes carried
127. See, e.g., DAVID BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ANTIQUITY 16 (2001).
128. See SHEILA AGER, INTERSTATE ARBrrRATIONS IN ThE GREEK WORLD 337-90 B.C. (1997);
BEDERMAN, supra note 127, at 8 n.14, 93-94 (noting that arbitration was not practiced much
among Romans or other ancient civilizations, with the exception of Persia).
129. This religious sanction was used to legitimate the practice. BEDERMAN,supra note 127,
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out by intergovernmental organizations, known as amphictyones,
which were formed among several states that shared religious sites,
as well as by city-states 30 The disputes they resolved typically
involved issues of territory, with historical and mythic evidence of
title arrayed against claims of use or possession. 3 The arbitrators
did not rely on centralized enforcement. We do not know precisely
how many of these decisions were enforced, but there seems to be
evidence of substantial compliance in the absence of centralized
enforcement.
32
In the modern period, an important juncture in the development
of routine procedures for use in international dispute resolution was
the Alabama arbitration between the United States and Britain,
concluded in 1872 and referred to at the outset of this Article.' 33 The
Alabama, built in Britain and sold to the Confederacy, sunk many
Union merchant ships. The United States claimed that the sale of
the ship violated Great Britain's obligations of neutrality, and
Britain disagreed. Several years after the end of the Civil War, the
Washington Treaty of May 1871 called on the parties to submit the
dispute to arbitration. The arbitral tribunal, involving one national
of each party and three neutrals, found that Britain violated its
at 82.
130. The object was to preserve these sites from violence; the organizations could arbitrate
disputes among its members as well as provide protection in wartime. Id. at 61. The Oracle
of Delphi served as one such arbitrator early on, but was not particularly good at it. Bederman
notes the case of Clazomenae and Cyme who were fighting about the ownership of a temple
between their two territories. The Oracle ruled that ownership would go to the first to make
a sacrifice at the temple. Rather than resolve the dispute, this expression intensified it as both
city-states raced to the temple to physically possess it. The Oracle was also apparently a poor
signaler, and the city-states ultimately secularised arbitral practice accordingly. Id. at 83
(claiming that the Oracle's awards "typically lacked the clarity and precision needed to settle
the matter authoritatively").
131. See AGER, supra note 127, at 4; BEDERMAN, supra note 127, at 84.
132. BEDERMAN, supra note 127, at 8 n.14.
133. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text; see also SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD
COURT 5 (5th ed. 1995); Henry T. King, Jr. & James D. Graham, The Origins of Modern
International Arbitration, 51 Disp. RE S. J. 42, 48 (1996); Monroe Leigh et al., International
Law Societies and the Development of International Law, 41 VA. J. INYL L. 941, 941 n.1 ("It
was widely held at the time that the Geneva Arbitration of 1872 averted a potential armed
conflict between the United States and United Kingdom ...."). But see David Caron, War and
International Adjudication, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 4, 9 (2000) (arguing that claims that the award
averted war are "somewhat exaggerated").
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obligations and further specified the obligations of neutral states in
wartime.'3
In terms of the framework set out in Part II, this dispute arose
over fuzziness in the convention on neutrality. The laws of war are
of ancient origin, and included not only obligations on the parties to
a conflict, but also obligations on neutral states not to support
either party militarily. Ordinary commercial transactions with
combatant parties, however, were generally considered to be legal.
How extensive were the obligations of a neutral government to
ensure that ordinary commercial transactions did not involve war
material? This issue was fuzzy: There were multiple possible
solutions, and the parties held different views as to which solution
should be adopted. The United States claimed that Britain was
under an obligation by virtue of her neutrality not to sell warships
to either side; the British government argued that the Alabama had
been built as a merchant ship and had been fitted at sea as a
warship, after which it had escaped from Britain."a Britain did not
consider itself to have provided war material to the Confederacy.
In this case, there was no real factual dispute, but rather a
question as to whether the conventions governing the obligations of
neutral states rendered Britain liable for the damage caused by the
Alabama. The Tribunal found that Britain was indeed liable and
required to pay $15.5 million in compensation to the United States,
which Britain duly paid." The arbitration thus generated compli-
ance in the immediate dispute before it and also clarified the scope
of the convention, holding that a neutral government in wartime is
obligated to use due diligence to prevent the equipping or building,
within its jurisdiction, of any vessel that it should believe is
intended to participate in war, and to prohibit belligerent powers
from using its ports or waters as the base of naval operations or
military supply. 37
Inspired by this successful arbitration, the Hague Peace Confer-
ences of 1899 and 1907 sought to facilitate the peaceful settlement
of interstate disputes, providing for commissions of inquiry,
134. King & Graham, supra note 133, at 48.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 49.
137. See Eric C. Bruggink, The "Alabama" Claims, 57 ALA. LAW. 339, 342 (1996).
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conciliation, mediation, arbitration, and adjudication and a
Permanent Court of International Arbitration (PCIA)."3s The PCIA
maintains lists of arbitrators available to states, publishes rules
governing arbitration and other procedures, and holds international
conferences on arbitration.'39 Although states frequently resorted to
the PCIA before the first World War,' 4° its caseload declined after
the 1922 creation of the Permanent Court of International Justice
(PCIJ), and the PCIA has not heard an interstate case since 1932."'
Its docket has been limited to a handful of ad hoc arbitrations since
that time."'2
The creation of the PCIJ marked a turning point in the
institutionalization of international dispute resolution." For the
first time, a standing body existed that could hear the entire
range of interstate claims. This institutionalization into a standing
body allowed the development of a reputation for quality and gave
the dispute resolver an incentive to signal accurately. The PCIJ
heard a wide range of cases before World War II suspended its
operations,'" and the court heard its last case in 1939."1 Neverthe-
less, in its lifetime it decided many important issues and laid the
foundation for the establishment of the ICJ in 1946.146
B. Three Pre-ICJ Case Studies
This section applies the model developed in Part II to three well-
known disputes of the pre-war period, one settled by the PCIJ, one
by a conciliator, and one settled by ad hoc arbitration. In each, the
138. See COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 2, at 35-36.
139. Id. at 36.
140. ROSENNE, supra note 133, at 17 (stating that fourteen disputes were handled by the
PCIA between 1902 and 1920).
141. COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 2, at 36-37. It has, however served as a registry for
interstate arbitrations.
142. Arbitration is also needed in a number of international trade and investment
agreements. Prominent examples include NAFTA's Chapter 11, which provides for arbitration
of disputes between individual investors and states, and the ICSID regime, which hosts
arbitration of disputes involving foreign investors. In addition, there is an extensive practice
of international commercial arbitration that is beyond the scope of this paper.
143. See BROWNLIE, supra note 75, at 709-10.
144. Id. at 710.
145. 1 J.H.W. VERzIJL, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE WORLD CoURT 599 (1965).
146. BROWNIUE, supra note 75, at 17-19; VERLJIL, supra note 145, at 57-58.
2004] 1291
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
dispute resolver used a combination of cheap talk and signaling to
resolve a coordination problem.
1. Eastern Greenland
As European colonial power extended its reach over the globe,
it was natural that the delimitation of borders would become an
increasingly salient problem. This led to an increasing demand
for border demarcation. One well-known example was the Legal
Status of Eastern Greenland case of 1933,"4 concerning the question
of whether Denmark or Norway had title to the vast, sparsely
inhabited territory of Greenland.'" The case focused on ambiguities
in the convention defining the acquisition of sovereignty over
previously unclaimed territory.49 Ultimately, the PCIJ resolved the
dispute and avoided a potentially costly conflict by rendering a
decision with which the parties complied.
a. History
The history of territorial claims to Greenland is convoluted.
Originally discovered by an outlaw exiled from Iceland after a blood
feud, Greenland became part of the Norwegian empire in the
thirteenth century, an empire that subsequently united with
Denmark in 1381.150 The colonies established there disintegrated
and were abandoned until a second Danish-Norwegian colony was
established in the eighteenth century under the authority of the
Norwegian-chartered Greenland Company. 5' Eventually, the
Company's operations were moved to Copenhagen along with the
monarchy.152 The ambiguous status of a Norwegian-chartered
company under a combined monarchy based in Denmark set the
147. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Nor. v. Den.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53 (Apr.
5).
148. Id. at 23.
149. See id. at 45.
150. OSCAR SVARtjEN, THE EASTERN GREENLAND CASE IN HITRICAL PERSPECTIVE 3-6
(1964).
151. Id. at 10-11.
152. See id. at 11.
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stage for both countries to claim primary authority over the
territory.
153
In 1814, Norway and Denmark were separated by the Treaty of
Kiel, by which Denmark ceded claims over Norway to Sweden.154
Denmark negotiated an article in the Treaty of Kiel purporting to
reserve Greenland and other overseas colonies from territory being
ceded to the Swedish king.155 This act of cession was later used by
Denmark to argue that it had sovereignty prior to and after 1814.156
Norway, in contrast, argued that this article of the Treaty had
violated its international rights, since Norway had been a separate
sovereign during the period of union with Denmark, and hence
Denmark had no ability to cede Norwegian colonies. 157 Norway
refused to recognize the Treaty of Kiel, though it undertook other
obligations called for in the treaty."8
An 1826 treaty between Denmark and Norway recognized Danish
sovereignty over Greenland and other colonies. 59 Norway's position
thereafter was that any Danish sovereignty over Greenland was
limited to those areas of permanent settlement where Denmark had
established an effective occupation." This was consistent with a
general view in international law that effective occupation was
necessary for international title.' 6' Norway continued to hunt, fish
and explore parts of western and northern Greenland as terra
nullius, territory that was open to all because it had not been
assimilated into a state. 62 Over time, Danish concerns about its title
grew, and it obtained from the United States in 1916 an assurance
that the United States "[would] not object to the Danish Govern-
ment extending their political and economic interests to the whole
153. Id. at 12.
154. Id. at 13-15.
155. Id (noting that Edmund Burke had cleverly made this provision).
156. Lawrence Preuss, The Dispute Between Denmark and Norway over the Sovereignty of
East Greenland, 26 AM. J. INTVL L. 469, 470-71 (1932).
157. SVARLIEN, supra note 150, at 15.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 21.
160. Id. at 22.
161. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTEtNATIONAL LAW 557, 562-63 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955).
162. SVARLIEN, supra note 150, at 22-25.
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of Greenland.""6 Three years later, Denmark asked Norway to
clarify its position, and the Norwegian foreign minister made a
verbal declaration to the effect that it would not oppose Danish
plans in Greenland.' When Denmark sought written confirmation,
however, none was forthcoming.'65
A later agreement between the two countries, signed in 1924,
reserved each country's position on the status of the territory while
establishing a modus vivendi"6 The agreement allowed both states
access to the territory for shipping, scientific research, and hunting
and fishing, while acknowledging the need for conservation and
asserting that disputes would be resolved by the PCIJ in the Hague.
The parties thus agreed to take steps to avoid conflict for a limited
period of time while leaving open the underlying issue of sover-
eignty.
In 1930, the controversy came to a head. Norway announced it
was appointing an official with police power over Norwegian citizens
in the disputed region.167 Denmark perceived this act to be an
assertion of sovereignty, and Denmark protested by sending a large
expeditionary force.'65 The Hawk/Dove game was engaged, with
potential for military conflict, as both parties pursued aggressive
strategies.
Denmark then proposed sending the issue to the PCIJ for final
resolution on the question of sovereignty. Norway agreed, but, on
July 10, 1931, occupied additional areas so that if the court found
that eastern Greenland was terra nullius, Norway already would
have established an effective occupation.16 9 The Danish argument
was that Norway's actions violated the existing legal situation,
while Norway asked the court to declare that Denmark had no
sovereignty over the region. Denmark argued that the Norwegian
foreign minister's 1919 oral assurances precluded Norwegian
occupation. 170
163. Convention between the United States and Denmark for Cession of Danish West
Indies, Aug. 4, 1916, U.S.-Den., 39 Stat. 1706, 1715.
164. SVARLIEN, supra note 150, at 29-30.
165. I& at 30.
166. Id. at 36.
167. Id. at 37.
168. Id.
169. See id. at 38-39.
170. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.IJ. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at
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b. Ambiguities
The Eastern Greenland case involved at least three ambiguities.
First, there was fuzziness in the convention of acquiring interna-
tional territory. Both parties agreed that the convention existed and
accepted basic notions of sovereignty that supported the convention.
They disagreed, however, as to which actions should be considered
as demonstrating sovereignty. Roman law had placed great
emphasis on occupation as the key for acquiring territory that had
no previous owner.' As stated earlier, there is good reason to
believe that giving title to those in physical possession is a useful
convention because the possessor is likely to play the'aggressive
strategy in defense of the territory.7 2
The general formulation for title over unclaimed territory is
effective occupation defined as taking possession and establishing
administration over territory,'73 and "displaying only such activity
as would be shown, under analogous circumstances, by any State
normally organized.""" This formulation, however, does not indicate
exactly what actions are necessary to establish effective occupation
in any particular case. Does it require constant occupation by
permanent settlement? Occasional patrols? A mere claim accompa-
nied by an act like planting a flag? There is, therefore, fuzziness in
the convention; multiple answers are possible as to the question of
exactly what acts are required to establish effective occupation over
a particular territory.
Second, even if the convention on territorial acquisition had not
been fuzzy, there were several sources of potential incomplete-
ness. 75 One concerned the conventions by which states become
36-37 (Apr. 5); see also SVARLIEN, supra note 150, at 42.
171. SVARLIEN, supra note 150, at 51.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 60-63.
173. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 161, at 557.
174. Alfred Verdross, RNgeles gdhnralses du droit international de la pais, in 30 AcADMuIE
DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL, RECuIL DES CouPs 271, 370 (1929), translated in SVARLIEN, supra
note 150, at 57.
175. One issue, which did not turn out to be dispositive, was the effect of the loss of the
colonies from the fourteenth through the sixteenth centuries. Even assuming a state had
acquired title to territory, would that title survive a long gap in possession and
administration? Ultimately, the court found that this issue was unimportant because,
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bound. It is well accepted that authorities such as heads of state and
foreign ministers can bind their states through undertakings in
their official capacities. What if the form of communication is not
written but oral? More specifically, did a unilateral oral declaration
by Norway estop it from claiming territory later? The Danish
government considered the foreign minister's verbal declaration a
binding commitment, meaning that Norway had formally waived its
objections to Danish sovereignty. Norway considered it a mere
demarche, a statement of intent but not a binding promise.
Finally, there was ambiguity about the state of the world. The
court had to clarify the factual matter of whether Danish acts of
authority had extended to places beyond the settled areas, some-
thing necessary for Denmark's claim of complete title.
c. Results
The court ultimately agreed with Denmark's position. First, the
court considered the effect of the Norwegian foreign minister's
verbal declaration and found that the circumstances of the declara-
tion rendered it binding on the state making it."76 Next, the court
resolved the ambiguity concerning territory. Because of Greenland's
vast area, Denmark could not assert effective occupation in the
sense of possession through settlement, but rather sought to
establish occupation through a display of state authority.177 The
court found that Denmark undertook such acts of authority, and
that Danish action had been sufficient to establish an effective
regardless of the answer, Denmark's claim flowed from the Treaty of Kiel signed well after
the reestablishment of the colony in Greenland. See SVARLIEN, supra note 150, at 42. The
court traced the entire history of the occupation and noted that the Danish-Norwegian
kingdoms had indeed exercised acts of sovereignty from 1381 onward through legislation and
administrative actions. Id. at 43. These had been directed at Greenland and had derived from
Norwegian actions. When the Treaty of Kiel ceded Norway to Sweden and reserved
Greenland, these territories remained with the remnant of the Danish-Norwegian empire,
namely Denmark. Id. at 46.
176. In part, it was easier to reach this result because there were no disputes about the
facts. Norway admitted the existence of the verbal statement and it had been recorded, so
there were no evidentiary problems regarding the verbal statement of the foreign minister.
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B), No. 53, at 36-37
(Apr. 5). One might imagine that in other circumstances, evidentiary concerns would prevent
a court from according binding status to oral declarations.
177. SVARLIEN, supra note 150, at 41.
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occupation, given the "Arctic and inaccessible character of the
uncolonized parts of the country."17 The particular type of action
necessary for effective occupation in this case, however, might be
different from a case where territory was habitable and welcoming.
The ambiguities in this case required both cheap talk and
signaling by the PCIJ. The court had to clarify ambiguities in
various conventions on acquiring territory and binding states. It
could do so by cheap talk that selected among multiple possible
solutions and by signaling its belief in the state of these conven-
tions, as well as underlying factual issues. The final vote of twelve
to two found Danish sovereignty over all of Greenland. 79 Norway
promptly revoked its proclamation asserting control, providing "an
outstanding example of how judicial process instead of armed force
can be made to settle disputes between sovereign states."I8°
2. Palmas Island Arbitration
Another well-known case involving third-party resolution of
international territorial disputes was the Palmas Island arbitration
between the United States and the Netherlands.' 8' This case
involved "most of the international substantive law of real property"
in a dispute over a small, sparsely inhabited island, located between
the American colony of the Philippines and the Dutch colony of
Indonesia. 2 At issue, again, were the principles by which title was
obtained to territory. Although the territory at issue was itself of
little value, there was risk of exacerbating the dispute between the
two parties, and a subsequent need to resolve the local coordination
problem. Ultimately, an international arbitral panel resolved the
issue, averting conflict and articulating the standards of interna-
tional territorial law.
178. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B), No. 53, at
50-51 (Apr. 5).
179. Id. at 75.
180. SVARLIN, supra note 150, at 74.
181. Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (Perm Ct. Arb. 1928); see also ROBERT
Y. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 88-126 (1963).
182. Philip C. Jessup, The Palmas Island Arbitration, 22 AM. J. INT-L L. 735, 735 (1928).
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a. History
The Spanish discovered the island of Palmas in the sixteenth
century but never utilized it."a Some time thereafter the Dutch East
India Company, which had established a colony in present-day
Indonesia, made contacts with various local chiefs, and it was, in
part, these contacts on which the Netherlands based its claim.' 8
The Americans claimed that the island was part of the territory
ceded by treaty from Spain in 1898.18 Failing to negotiate an
agreement as to the disposition of the territory, the parties con-
cluded a special agreement calling for a determination by an
arbitrator in 1925.18
b. Ambiguities
The case involved three ambiguities involving conventions, the
facts, and the question of governing law. The first ambiguity
involved the conventions by which title to territory is determined in
international law. Each party put forward alternative principles,
and the task of the arbitrator was to determine which of these
principles constituted the actual state of the convention. The United
States advanced two principles, discovery and contiguity, as giving
rise to sovereignty. First, the Spanish acquired the territory through
discovery, an acceptable manner of taking title to land."8 7 This title,
it was argued, was intact when the Spanish ceded the Philippines
following the Spanish-American War of 1898.1' Second, the United
States argued it should have title by virtue of the contiguity of the
territory to the main Philippine islands to which title was uncon-
tested."9 The United States argued that the island was essentially
a part of the Philippine archipelago, and that not every inch of the
archipelago needed to be physically possessed to gain title."9 The
183. Id. at 738-39.
184. Id. at 744.
185. Id. at 737.
186. See Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 831-34.
187. Id. at 837.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 854.
190. Jessup, supra note 182, at 742-43 (asserting that the arbitrator misapprehended the
American argument).
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Dutch contested the American view of the convention for taking
title, arguing that title required subsequent acts beyond mere
discovery, and rejecting contiguity as a coherent principle for
establishing title.191
Second, besides the issues of the current state of the convention,
there was an issue as to the law of which period of time should
govern. The United States' position was that international law
granted title to the discoverer at the time Spain first discovered the
island of Palmas in the sixteenth century.' This was consistent
with the doctrine of inter-temporal law, as the principle was known
in international law. 93 The Netherlands argued that a present
dispute had to take into account changing conceptions of law,
because the issue of possession was evolving and subject to changing
rules.' 9
The third ambiguity was a factual dispute between the two
nations requiring signaling to resolve. The Dutch contested Spanish
discovery, claiming that the Dutch East India Company had been
the first external actor to possess the territory and exercise
sovereignty in 1677."95 Both parties brought much evidence, dating
back to the sixteenth century, involving various contacts, map
evidence, and contemporary accounts of the island. The task of the
arbitrator was to signal its beliefs about the facts of first discovery.
c. Results
The arbitrator accepted the position of the Netherlands on both
the question of which convention should govern and on the state of
the current law."9 He found that contemporary international law
was the relevant governing principle. He further found that
international law required an effective occupation involving a
"continuous and peaceful display" of the functions of a state.' 97 The
191. See Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 837.
192. Id at 837.
193. BROWNLIE, supra note 75, at 126-27.
194. Id. at 127.
195. See Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 855-56.
196. Id at 867-69; see also SVARLIEN, supra note 150, at 50.51 (criticizing the logic of this
position); Jessup, supra note 182, at 739-40 (same).
197. Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 868.
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Spanish title based on discovery had only given inchoate title, and
thus the United States could not accede to it without showing
continuous exercise of authority. 198 The arbitrator also rejected the
contiguity theory offered by the United States. 99
Accepting the Netherlands' argument on this point did not resolve
all the outstanding questions, for there was still the factual
ambiguity as to which state had established an effective occupation.
The arbitrator first attributed the acts of the Dutch East India
Company, which had contacted various local chiefs, to the Nether-
lands itself. °" The arbitrator then noted that there had been no
recorded acts of Spanish occupation prior to the 1898 treaty
purporting to cede the Philippine islands to the United States. Just
prior to this, the Dutch had officially visited the island of Palmas in
1895 and 1898.201 This exercise of authority gave the Netherlands
actual title, at least vis-h-vis Spain, according to the arbitrator.
Since Spain did not have title, it could not have ceded the territory
to the United States.2°
As in the Eastern Greenland case, the issue was resolved by the
third party because there were no subsequent conflicts over the
territory, a situation we characterize as compliance. While not a
high stakes dispute, this decision laid the groundwork for the
resolution of future territorial disputes by clarifying conventions
and determining which asymmetries mattered as between compet-
ing sovereign claims. The tribunal clarified the ambiguity in the
convention to rule that, under international law, discovery, without
any further display of authority or occupation of an island, did not
demonstrate ownership where another state exercised actual
authority over the same island. The arbitrator further noted that
displays of sovereignty must be open and public, though they do not
require special notice.20 3
198. See id. at 869.
199. See id. ("The title of contiguity, as understood as a basis of territorial sovereignty, has
no foundation in international law.").
200. Id. at 868.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 869.
203. Id. at 868.
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3. Conciliation of Japanese Loans
Another example of successful interstate dispute resolution
concerned the conciliation' of a dispute related to a series of bonds
issued by Japan on European markets before World War I.2"5 The
ambiguity concerned whether the loans were to be paid back in the
1950s at nominal value given the unanticipated inflation caused by
the intervening wars. This dispute involved a question of valuation,
and illustrates how cheap talk and signaling can interact in
resolving high stakes disputes.
a. History
Prior to World War I, Japan issued bonds to finance its industrial-
ization. When European bondholders demanded repayment on a
gold standard in the 1950s, the Japanese government countered by
seeking to repay the loans at nominal value, a significantly lower
amount because of inflation related to the two intervening world
wars.' The parties submitted their dispute to the head of the
International Monetary Fund, who suggested a conciliator." 7 The
conciliator, in turn, appointed a jurist and two economists to advise
on the resolution. The conciliator's report proposed an equitable
solution, which was accepted by the parties."
204. Conciliation is a mechanism of dispute resolution that involves both fact-finding and
explicitly nonbinding recommendations. A conciliator's proposals take effect if adopted
voluntarily by the parties. Conciliators are not restricted to using legal norms in their
proposals. The paradigm case is when a third party elucidates facts and offers a single
solution. This solution might work either by creating a focal point or a signal of the
conciliator's views of the facts and what would constitute a fair outcome. Like many of the
other mechanisms discussed here, conciliation is an option to which many treaties refer, has
been promoted by the United Nations and other organizations, and was a relatively common
method of resolving disputes in the early years after the Hague peace conferences. G.A. Res.
50, United Nations Model Rules for the Conciliation of Disputes between States, U.N. GAOR,
50th Sess., 87th mtg. 1I 1-4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/50 (1995); INTL BUREAU OF THE PERMANENT
COURT OF INT'L ARBITRATION, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION OPTIONAL CONCILIATION
RULES (1996). Conciliation has been more limited since the establishment of the United
Nations in 1945.
205. See JEAN-PIERRE COT, INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION 96-97 (R. Myers trans., 1972).
206. See id at 96.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 97. Another similar dispute was resolved by the President of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 1960, and the ICJ was asked to resolve a similar
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b. Ambiguities
This dispute can be characterized as an iterated prisoners'
dilemma. International financial markets involve capital issuers
and borrowers in various countries engaged in repeated prisoners'
dilemma games. In a single iteration, paying back a loan might be
costly to the borrower, but the borrower that defaults will not be
able to borrow in the future. Any two industrialized states are
likely, over time, to have in their territory both creditors and
debtors, and therefore will develop norms of reciprocity and produce
a cooperative equilibrium wherein each state has an interest in
ensuring payback of loans by debtors in its jurisdiction. This gives
rise to a convention called pay back obligations that parties are
likely to observe as being in their self-interest.
In terms of the framework offered in Part II above, this game
involves a problem about the potential incompleteness of the
convention of loan repayment. Assuming that the parties to the loan
agreements did not anticipate two world wars and rapid inflation,
it is plausible that their agreement did not correctly specify how the
rate would vary under such circumstances. The convention-both in
the narrow sense of the actual loan agreement and the broader
convention of "pay back obligations"-did not cover the precise
question of the valuation of the bonds in the circumstances that
arose. Should the question remain unresolved, each party would
believe the convention favored its position and justified its sanction-
ing the other. There would be a danger that the cooperative
equilibrium of the iterated prisoners' dilemma would give way to
mutual defection; the prior pattern of borrowing and repaying would
be less stable. The parties thus need a solution to help resolve what
the precise scope of the convention required.
The job of a third party in such a situation is twofold. First, it
must decide whether or not any adjustment should be made for
radical inflation. Second, if the answer is yes, it must determine the
magnitude of the adjustment. Once the third party decides that an
adjustment is required, the determination of the amount requires
case involving Norwegian loans in 1957, but found it had no jurisdiction. Case Involving
Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 7 (July 6).
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both signaling and cheap talk. First, the conciliator must exclude
values that fall outside the range of plausible amounts; and second,
she must choose a solution within the remaining range. The ex-
clusion of implausible amounts is a signaling function, even though
the conciliator may not send the signal explicitly to the parties. The
selection of a solution within the acceptable range likely involves
elements of randomization. The conciliator chooses a solution that
becomes focal, even though neither party may believe that it
represents the precise level of the value of the loans.2
c. Results
The conciliator offered the solution that the loans be repaid at
twelve times their nominal value.2 10 This was a combination of
implicit signaling and cheap talk. The conciliator employed econo-
mists and made efforts to take into account the various devaluations
of the two countries' currencies, meaning that the actual range
within which the equitable determination occurred did not appear
to be large.2 ' At the same time, the determination of the value
within this range involved cheap talk. The combination of signaling
and cheap talk helped resolve the dispute, and payment was duly
made in accordance with the report.2
C. The International Court of Justice
The above three case studies concerned different types of
institutions to resolve disputes. Although the precise mode of dis-
pute resolution differed-judicial determination in Eastern Green-
land, ad hoc arbitration in Island of Palmas, and conciliation in
Japanese Loans-all involved a combination of cheap talk and
signaling to varying degrees. This section focuses on the ICJ in the
Hague. As the main judicial organ of the United Nations, the ICJ is
the most prominent international court and a centerpiece of the
hopes and aspirations of many international lawyers that their
209. Sometimes the third party may simply signal the range, and suggest the parties
bargain to a solution.
210. COT, supra note 205, at 97.
211. See id.
212. Id.
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institutions may resolve conflict.213 This section discusses the
caseload of the ICJ in detail and argues that it has been effective
when it focuses on resolving coordination problems among states.
1. Background of the ICJ
The ICJ was founded in 1945 under the United Nations (UN)
Charter.2 14 If one views dispute resolution on a continuum of
formality, from mediation on the one hand to binding judicial
decision on the other, it is important to note that the ICJ is more
like a consensus-based arbitral body than the name "court" would
suggest.215 In the ICJ, unlike in most domestic court processes,
states are entitled to pick a judge ad hoc to serve on the court in
instances when they do not already have a judge of their nationality
present.216 Similarly, unlike most national courts, states can choose
to allow the court to decide cases on the basis of equity (ex aequeo et
bono) rather than on purely legal considerations.2"' These features
213. See U.N. CHARTER art. 92. There has been a recent proliferation of other standing
international tribunals, such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS),
and the Appellate Body of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). The increasing number of these standing bodies, alongwith the creation
of a number of ad hoc tribunals, have led some observers to note that the proliferation of
dispute-resolving bodies entails risks of inconsistency and forum shopping. Roger Alford, The
Proliferation ofInternational Courts and Tribunals: InternationalAdjudication in Ascendance,
94 AM. Soc. INVL L. PRoc. 160, 164-65 (2000); Jonathan I. Charney, The Impact on the
International Legal System of the Growth of International Courts and Tribunals, 31 N.Y.U.
J. INTVL L. & POL. 697, 698 (1999); Rosalyn Higgins, The ICJ, the ECJ, and the Integrity of
International Law, 52 INTYL & COMP. L.Q. 1, 12-13 (2003); Cesare P.R. Romano, The
Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 709 (1999); Shane Spelliscy, The Proliferation of International Tribunals: A Chink in
the Armor, 40 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 143 (2001); Stephan, supra note 32, at 333-34. Given
our expressive theory, the competition among tribunals may be productive. If there were a
monopoly on third-party adjudication in a context without centralized sanctions, the third-
party adjudicator would have less incentive to provide accurate signals. Competition means
that alternative coordinators can compete with each other to provide accurate adjudication.
This is particularly true when a single treaty regime gives states options as to the mode of
dispute settlement. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Nov. 16,1994,
art. 188, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 476.
214. U.N. CHARTER art. 97.
215. See ROSENNE, supra note 133, at 19 (discussing the influence of arbitration on
international adjudication).
216. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 31, I.C.J. Acts & Docs [hereinafter
ICJ Statute].
217. Id. art. 38(2).
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more resemble ad hoc arbitration than a domestic judicial process.
Further, the consensual character of the sources of international
law means that states have, at least in theory, agreed to the norms
under which the decision will be made just as in private contracts
to arbitrate. This is especially apparent for cases that are submitted
to the ICJ by special compromis or under the treaty jurisdiction.
Rather than serving as a court of general jurisdiction covering all
international disputes, jurisdiction of the ICJ is, essentially,
voluntary in character. Under Article 36 of the Statute of the ICJ,
the court has jurisdiction over (1) cases referred to it specifically by
the parties by special agreement (hereinafter abbreviated SA); (2)
cases provided for in treaties and conventions, including the UN
Charter; and (3) cases between parties that have submitted to
compulsory jurisdiction of the court under the so-called "Optional
Clause" of Article 36(2).21s
The first two categories ofjurisdiction are essentially coextensive
with what would be exercised by any arbitral tribunal. Essentially,
a treaty or special agreement, like a private contract, provides
advance agreement to submit disputes to a particular forum.219 The
more complex source of jurisdiction is the Optional Clause. Coun-
tries that have deposited a declaration accepting jurisdiction under
Article 36(2) agree to the court's jurisdiction to hear any case
involving any other country that has also accepted the Clause.22 ° It
was anticipated that the Optional Clause would provide a means for
ever-increasing numbers of states to submit to jurisdiction, and
facilitate the goals of international cooperation held by the drafters
of the UN Charter.22' Unfortunately, the Optional Clause has been,
218. Id. art. 36. On the history of the Optional Clause, see Leo Gross, Compulsory
Jurisdiction Under the Optional Clause: History and Practice, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 19 (Lori Fischer Damrosch ed., 1987). The court also has
advisory jurisdiction by which it can give opinions on any legal question if requested to do so
by a competent international organization within the United Nations System. See ICJ Statute
arts. 65-68. In addition, parties may request that the other party participate in a case,
notwithstanding the fact that there is no legal basis of jurisdiction; such cases are called
forum prorogatum and have never led to a decision on the merits. There has not been an
instance when a party sought this type of jurisdiction since 1959.
219. The ICJ will only hear treaty disputes based on those treaties that specifically
designate the ICJ as a forum for disputes, and a relatively small percentage of treaties include
such clauses. See Guzman, supra note 6, at 1873.
220. ICJ Statute art. 36(2).
221. In keeping with idealistic views of international lawyers at the time, it was assumed
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by and large, a failure.222 There is much lamentation among
international lawyers about the reluctance of countries to submit to
compulsory jurisdiction.223 In the words of one member of the ICJ,
this failure "prevents the International Court of Justice from
fulfilling its essential role."2"
At the same time, the ICJ docket is larger than ever before,
causing judges to call for increasing its budget.2" There is a disjunct
here. The court is the busiest in its lifetime, yet some observers
believe it is failing to fulfill its role. We argue that the court is
indeed fulfilling its essential role: that is, helping states to
consensually resolve coordination games.226 The idea that the ICJ
has other essential functions relies on an idealistic misunderstand-
ing of the nature of international adjudication. In particular, this
idea assumes the court can do more than it can. Understanding the
that the Optional Clause would be widely used. As more countries submitted to compulsory
jurisdiction, more disputes would be resolved and global conflict would decline. See, e.g.,
SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 419 (Martinus
Nijhoffed., 1985) (finding the Optional Clause a "valuable element in the general organization
for peace").
222. See, e.g., Robert Keohane et al., Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and
Transnational, 54 INVL ORG. 457, 480-81 (2000); Shigeru Oda, The Compulsory Jurisdiction
of the ICJ: A Myth?, 49 INWL & COMP. L.Q. 251, 252 (1999).
223. See, e.g., RICHARD FALK, REVIVING THE WORLD COURT (1986); THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS, supra note 218, at 3-182.
224. Oda, supra note 222, at 251.
225. Gilbert Guillaume, Speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations (Oct. 30,
2001).
226. The essentially consensual character of ICJ jurisdiction helps explain in part why the
other major dispute resolution body established early in the twentieth century, the
Permanent Court of International Arbitration (PCIA), also housed in the Peace Palace in the
Hague, has been nearly moribund for most of its life. The 1998 Annual Report of the PCIA
provides a complete listing of the cases submitted to arbitration by the Permanent Court "or
(cionducted with the [cdo-operation of the International Bureau." P.C.I.A Ann. Rep. 29 (1998).
Only nine such cases are listed since 1938, and in some of these the role of the PCIA is limited
to serving as or designating an appointing authority in the event the parties fail to agree upon
on arbitrator. Id. at app. 2. Some scholars have puzzled over why there is so little interstate
arbitration. See, e.g., Mattli, supra note 33, at 945-46. It seems fairly clear that the ICJ
already has enough consensual elements to satisfy party demands, so there is little benefit
from a separate arbitral institution. In addition, the PCIA is more court-like than private
arbitration, in that decisions are typically published. This means that at the international
level the distinction between adjudication and arbitration is less sharp than in a domestic
legal system, so there is little advantage to going before the PCIA. Indeed, our framework
suggests that when two alternative institutions provide the same service at the international
level, one of the institutions is likely to become focal over time as it develops a reputation for
successful dispute resolution. The ICJ has done so, while the PCIA has become marginal.
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ICJ as an essentially consensual body helps to understand what
international adjudication can and cannot do in the absence of
sanctions.
Once a case is filed, an ICJ proceeding can contain a number of
phases. First, there are sometimes requests for provisional mea-
sures akin to injunctive relief which can occur before or after
jurisdictional objections. In some cases, the denial of such a request
can effectively resolve the dispute by eliminating the object at
issue. Second, states can object to jurisdiction. Third, if any
jurisdictional objections were overruled, the court can conduct a
merits phase. In this phase the court resolves the substantive issues
of fact and law that have given rise to the dispute. The court does so
in accordance with the compromis, or with the treaty provisions
calling forjudicial dispute resolution. This phase requires signals as
to contested states of the world and cheap talk to provide possible
outcomes. Figure 5 below diagrams the stages of a dispute in terms
of time, with optional phases in brackets.
Figure 5: Chronology of ICJ Disputing
Time
[Parties nego- Dispute Party or [Request [Jurisd- Merits Comp-
tiate a clause arises parties for provi- ictional Phase liance?
calling for file a sional mea- Objections]
ICJ jurisdic- claim sures]
tion] I I 1 1
227. In the Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.),
1998 I.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9), Paraguay sued the United States regarding Francisco Breard, one
of its nationals who was arrested for murder and subsequently executed by the State of
Virginia, without having been informed of his treaty right to communicate with the
Paraguyan consulate about his detention. Id. at 249. Paraguay requested provisional
measures to stay the execution, which the Court subsequently approved. Id. at 250. The
United States, however, argued that it had no power to stop the State of Virginia from
executing Breard. Although the Secretary of State eventually wrote a letter to the State of
Virginia, Breard was executed. Paraguay subsequently discontinued the proceedings. Id. In
a later case with similar facts, Germany continued the suit after the execution of one of its
nationals and the court found that the United States had committed an international wrong.
The Lagrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. (June 27), available at http'//www.icj-cij.org.
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Like medieval Iceland, but unlike most domestic legal systems,
there is no centralized enforcement of ICJ decisions. Although the
UN Charter requires member states to comply with such decisions,
the dissatisfied party's only recourse is to seek enforcement from the
Security Council under Article 94 of the UN Charter.228 The Security
Council, under that provision, is empowered to "make recommenda-
tions or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the
judgment," a weak formulation.2  Such requests for enforcement are
rare and the Security Council has never acted to enforce an ICJ
decision, making compliance voluntary if it occurs at all.21 0
2. The ICJ as Coordinator: Evidence of Compliance
Is there evidence that international adjudication resolves
coordination problems? The next two sections consider cases that
have been resolved by the ICJ and provide some suggestion that the
primary function of the court is to resolve situations in which states
are in mixed games of coordination and conflict. Our approach is
both interpretive and empirical; it marshalls evidencethat supports
this interpretation, rather than proving a hypothesis. It is a difficult
task, however, to reason backwards from observed cases to the
processes by which cases come to court. As an empirical matter,
significant selection bias among cases referred to international
adjudication likely exists."' The filed cases emerge from a much
broader universe of potential claims. 2 In particular, only the
disputes capable of resolution likely come before the court, which
leads to a high level of observed compliance.
This Article's theory engages this selection bias, and explains why
it operates by focusing on not what cases are filed before the ICJ,
but what cases are resolved by the ICJ. Although there may be
multiple reasons that countries file cases,' many of these cases will
228. U.N. CHAR7ZR art. 94.
229. Id at para. 2.
230. Attila Tanzi, Problems of Enforcement of Decisions of the ICJ and the Law of the
United Nations, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 539 (1995).
231. See generally Simmons, supra note 6 (asserting selection bias may differ across
international issue areas).
232. William R. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaming, Claiming..., 15 LAw & Socy REV. 631,632 (1980).
233. Scholars who have asked why it is that countries send cases to the ICJ suggest that
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be incapable of resolution by a court lacking the power of sanctions.
This theory predicts not just that easy cases will be resolved, but
that the only cases effectively resolved by the ICJ will be coordina-
tion problems. In this subset of cases, each party can anticipate that
the other party will comply with an adverse decision in the absence
of centralized enforcement, thereby making signaling and cheap
talk effective.
To date, scholars have provided very little evidence of what kind
of cases come before the ICJ and what kind of cases are successfully
resolved by it. The Appendix contains a dataset of the complete
docket of contentious cases before the ICJ since 1947, broken down
by type of issue, basis ofjurisdiction, and other characteristics of the
pairs of disputants. We analyze below the forty-one cases of the
docket (out of 129 total filed claims to date), for which there have
been either decisions rendered on the merits or an order for
provisional measures that might require compliance, to determine
what characteristics are associated with successful adjudication and
compliance.
Table 1: Basis of Jurisdiction in Cases Proceeding to Merits
Basis of Jurisdiction # of Decisions % of Decisions
on Merits on Merits (n=41)
Special Agreement 14 34
Tacit Consent 9 22
Jurisdiction Contested 18 44
TOTAL 41 100
Table 1 provides the jurisdictional bases for these cases. Truly
consensual cases form a significant subset of the disputes in which
the decision to file is complex. Dana Fischer's 1982 qualitative study looked at four major ICJ
cases, and drew three major conclusions about the circumstances under which countries take
cases to court. Dana D. Fischer, Decisions to Use the International Court of Justice, Four
Recent Cases, 26 INrVL STUD. Q. 251, 255, 271 (1982). First, he concluded that countries prefer
to initiate litigation when they believe it will help them in negotiation with the other party.
Id. at 271. Second, Fischer noted that countries sometimes view a court decision as helping
them to save face with domestic constituencies. Id. Third, Fischer also argued that the parties
sometimes seek to clarify the law. Id. at 272 (noting especially the North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases, involving existing treaties that were unclear on the rules of delimitation).
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a decision was issued on the merits. Jurisdiction in fourteen cases
was established by special agreement by the parties, and there was
tacit consent to jurisdiction, meaning there were no preliminary
objections to the asserted bases ofjurisdiction, in nine others. Thus,
in nearly a third of cases filed before the ICJ and nearly sixty
percent of cases for which a decision on the merits was issued,
jurisdiction was consensual.
The cases were coded for full or partial noncompliance. Given the
difficulty of establishing compliance as an empirical matter, the
coding focused on prominent instances of noncompliance because
they were easier to observe by using simple but broad criteria. Any
case in which a party delayed implementation of an order by greater
than one year counted as an instance of noncompliance. Examples
include the Corfu Channel case when Albania took more than four
decades to pay a sum to Great Britain,"4 and the first Asylum case
in the 1950s, when the court found that a Colombian grant of
asylum to a Peruvian dissident was not in conformity with the law,
yet Colombia did not end the asylum.2"5 For border disputes, we
examined whether there were continuing hostilities or contestation
of the border within a year of the decision. The coding also included
any case wherein one party withdrew from compulsory jurisdiction
after the decision. Thus, the behaviour of the French after the
Nuclear Tests case"3 and the United States after the Nicaragua
case 237 were coded as instances of noncompliance. In these instances
the parties found that continued resolution was not helpful. Finally,
the coding included any case in which the court issued provisional
measures that were ignored. This would include the recent case
involving the execution in the United States of the Paraguayan
national Breard in defiance of the court's explicit orders.' Using
these criteria, we counted thirteen instances of full or partial
234. Corfu Channel (Alb. v. U ), 1949 I.C.J. 243 (Dec. 15).
235. Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277 (Nov. 20).
236. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20).
237. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Nov. 26).
238. See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.),
1998 I.C.J. 427 (June 8).
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noncompliance out of forty-one cases for a compliance rate of sixty-
eight percent.3 9
Next we wish to test alternative theories of compliance. There are
two main rival sets of hypotheses that purport to explain compliance
with international law. One set of theories is ideology-based and
focuses on the legitimacy of the decision-making process or the
character of the disputants. In particular, liberal theory argues that
international law is a project of liberal states, and suggests that
liberal states are more likely to comply. 240 To test ideology-based
theories, we use in this empirical study an independent variable,
DEMOCRACY, which reports the sum of democracy scores of the
pair of disputants reported in the POLITY III database (ranging
between 0 and 20). This variable tests the proposition that compli-
ance is more likely when both disputants are democratic. The
prediction is that this variable will produce a positive coefficient in
a regression with compliance as the dependent variable.241
Another theory draws on rationalist assumptions, but describes
compliance as resulting from a state's concern with reputation.242 To
capture this theory, we use a variable, Shared UN Scores (SUN),
that might plausibly predict compliance by virtue of capturing state
similarity and density of relationships. Our assumption is that more
similar states care more about each other's positive reputation for
compliance. 2' To illustrate, the United States might be more
concerned about the reputational loss from noncompliance with a
239. See infra Appendix for coding.
240. See Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the
Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1907, 1920-21 (1992); Andrew Moravcsik, Taking
Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INTL ORG. 513, 514-15
(1997); Andrea Kupfer Schneider, GettingAlong: The Evolution of Dispute Resolution Regimes
in International Trade Organizations, 20 MICH. J. INTL L. 697,763 (2002) ("[lt is more likely
that the International Adjudication Regime will work better with democratic states
committed to upholding the rule of law.*); Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a
World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INTL L. 503,508 (1995).
241. Note that it is arguable that the democracy score of the losing party is the only
relevant variable to test the proposition that only liberal states are likely to comply with ICJ
decisions. For many ICJ decisions, determining the "loser" is difficult. Either party can violate
a decision demarcating a border, for example. Nevertheless, our results are robust to
alternative specifications of the data using only the democracy score of the party we coded as
having the primary obligation to comply.
242. Guzman, supra note 6, at 1861.
243. Although states that are not similar may also care about reputation, we assume that
states that are similar will care more about reputation.
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decision in a dispute with the United Kingdom than with Libya. In
addition, more similar states are likely to have more interactions,
and thus have greater power to sanction one another in the future.
SUN reports the percentage of shared votes in the United Nations
General Assembly for the disputants during the year in which they
filed the case at the ICJ. A high SUN score indicates similarity of
votes at the United Nations and is a proxy for shared policy
positions. The prediction is that a higher SUN score will lead to
higher compliance, and thus that the independent variable will have
a positive coefficient in the model estimation.
Coordination theory is captured in PRELIM that reports whether
preliminary objections were overruled in the case. PRELIM is a
dummy variable that takes value one if objections were filed and
overruled, and takes value zero if no objections were filed.2" The
assumption is that disputes where one party objected to jurisdiction
are likely to be less consensual and hence less likely to elicit
compliance. If a state objects to the court's jurisdiction, this suggests
that the underlying game is not primarily one of coordination and
one state believes that it would be better off without the adjudica-
tor's expression. This occurs if the costs of continuing conflict are not
such that both states would be better off with a resolution of the
dispute, which means the game is not Hawk/Dove. If a state is in
this circumstance, neither signaling nor focal points are likely to
induce the state to change its behavior.
If reputation concerns or legitimacy were the primary determi-
nants of compliance, there is no reason to think that the level of
compliance would fall whenjurisdictional objections were overruled.
Indeed, one could argue that reputation benefits would be enhanced
by compliance after such a decision: compliance even after objecting
to jurisdiction would presumably be better for a state's reputation.
Similarly, for legitimacy theorists, the state would be showing its
willingness to comply even in an adverse situation, which would
presumably demonstrate its commitment to the rule of law. For
liberal theorists, there ought to be no difference between the
willingness to comply before and after an adverse jurisdictional
ruling, because the democratic nature of the state remains constant.
244. Note that if objections were filed and upheld by the ICJ, the case would be over and
there would be no decision capable of generating compliance.
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To test which theory best explains compliance, we utilize a simple
logit model with the three proxy variables, DEMOC, PRELIM, and
SUN, as independent variables and compliance as the dependent
variable. The following figure reports the results of a logit regres-
sion with this model.
Figure 6: ICJ Compliance Model-Logit Results
SUMMARY OUTPUT y = COMPLIANCE
Model Summary
-2 Log likelihood 40.3
Cox/Snell R Square 0.23
Nagelkerke R
square 0.33
Observations 41
% observations of
compliance
correctly predicted 82.1%
% observations of
noncompliance cor-
rectly predicted 61.5%
Overall percentage 75.6%
Standard
Coefficient Error Significance
Constant 2.89 1.08 0.03
PRELIM -2.42 .79 0.01
DEMOC -0.08 0.06 0.18
SUN 0.11 0.93 0.9
The regression results show that the strongest predictor of
compliance, and the only variable to reach statistical significance,
is a lack of preliminary objections. The negative sign and statisti-
cally significant coefficient indicate that PRELIM negatively
predicts compliance. Cases in which preliminary objections were
overruled were those least likely to result in compliance. Consistent
with our expressive theory, compliance is most likely to occur when
both sides want adjudication.
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One interesting result that we found is that there appears to be
no support for the hypothesis that democratic nations are more
likely to observe international law. Dispute resolution between
democratic countries was slightly less likely to generate compliance,
though the effect was too small to treat as reliable. This result
contrasts with the views of those scholars who argue that interna-
tional law, as a reflection of distinctively liberal values, is more
likely to be complied with by liberal states. 21 In several of the
celebrated instances of noncompliance with the ICJ decisions in
recent decades, it is precisely the liberal states (France and the
United States) that have failed to abide by the adjudicated decision,
and have in fact withdrawn from the regime of the ICJ Optional
Clause in response to adverse decisions. The negative correlation in
this small sample between democracy and compliance should not be
overstated, but in this particular realm this result hardly supports
the arguments that liberal democracies are in fact more likely to
comply. The large number of ICJ cases involving countries such as
Libya, involved in six ICJ cases, shows that nondemocratic coun-
tries also have a need for coordination and are willing to comply
with decisions.
Note also that reputation theory has a hard time explaining the
significance ofjurisdictional objections. Jurisdictional objections are
an indication that a state views an adverse decision as costly. Yet,
we observe that states are unwilling to comply in these circum-
stances. Whereas one might be able to construct an ad hoc
reputation-based account of this phenomenon, we believe that
coordination provides a superior theoretical predictor of compliance.
3. The ICJ as Coordinator: Types of Cases
We next examine in detail the subject matter of ICJ cases that
are filed and the subset that are ultimately resolved. We believe
that the types of cases heard by the court tend to be those that have
significant elements of coordination. Table 1 shows the ICJ docket
245. For example, Anne-Marie Slaughter famously argued that liberal democracies are
more likely to comply with their obligations than other states. See Slaughter, supra note 240,
at 522-23.
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categorized by subject matter. We describe the dynamics of each
type of case below.
Table 2: Subject Matter of Contentious ICJ Cases
Subject Matter Number of Number of % of Filed Number of De-
Cases Filed Decisions on Cases Leading cisions
and Closed Merits+ to Merits Deci- Complied with
(% of Total (% of Total sions (Compliance
Cases Filed Decisions on Rate of Deci-
& Closed) Merits) sions on Merits)
Borders/Maritime 24 (29%) 21 (48%) 88% 18 (86%)
Delimitation
Use of Force 23 (28%) 5(13%) 22% 2 (40%)
Private property 13 (16%) 2 (7%) 15% 2 (100%)
rights, including
espousal of
claims
Diplomatic or 8 (10%) 7 (17%) 88% 3 (43%)
consular rela-
tions
Other 14 (7%) 6 (12%) 43% 3 (50%)
TOTAL 82 41 50% 28 (68%)
+ includes cases in which the only outcome was an order for provisional measures.
The table shows that half of ICJ cases filed do not lead to a final
decision on the merits but are disposed of in some other manner.
These early disposals might be a result of jurisdictional objections
being upheld. They might also result from states withdrawing from
cases for a variety of reasons. These reasons might include:
settlement, removal of the offending condition that gave rise to the
dispute, or decision by the applicant state that further pursuit of the
case will not benefit it.2"
246. Another possibility is that the case was filed for reasons other than the desire to reach
a decision on the merits. For example, if a state files a case in the ICJ to gain publicity in its
dispute, or to secure an advantage in bilateral bargaining, there is no reason to expect the
state to necessarily pursue the claims all the way to the merits stage.
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Comparing the percentages of cases filed and decisions on the
merits, it is striking that different types of claims have different
likelihoods of leading to decisions on the merits. One should of
course be careful about drawing overall conclusions about different
categories of disputes and compliance rates based on such a small
number of cases.247 Nonetheless, a clear pattern emerges. Cases
involving borders and diplomatic protection, for example, are very
likely to lead to a final decision on the merits. On the other hand,
use of force and individual property rights cases are less likely to do
so. Applicant states in these latter types of cases seem to be filing
cases for another purpose rather than trying to achieve a final
resolution. Compliance rates also reflect this. The majority of border
cases filed led not only to decisions but to compliance. Very few of
those disputes involve the use of force.
Why is it that some types of cases are more likely to generate
decisions on the merits and compliance? Reputation and legitimacy
theories do not produce clear predictions on variance. We think the
answer lies in the role of dispute resolution in solving coordination
games. Specifically, when the underlying dispute involves coordina-
tion, the possibility ofjudicial resolution increases dramatically. In
247. For example, the compliance figure for the category of disputes involving diplomatic
protection is distorted by three filed cases in the early 1950s. See Haya de la Torre (Colom.
v. Peru), 1951 I.C.J. 71 (June 13); Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of November
20th, 1950, in the Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 395 (Nov. 27); Asylum (Colom.
v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20). These cases concerned the Peruvian politician Victor Haya
de la Torre who sought protection in the Colombian Embassy in Lima after a failed coup
attempt. Asylum, 1950 I.C.J. at 272. Colombia argued that de la Torre had committed a
political offense and was entitled to asylum and safe passage under regional customary
international law in Latin America. Id. at 273-78. The initial case concerned the
interpretation of an agreement by the two countries to allow either one to institute
proceedings before the court. The court's first decision found that Peru did not have to give
safe passage, and that the asylum was not wholly proper, but the court did not determine the
merits of the underlying dispute. Id. at 288. As a result, Colombia immediately requested that
the court interpret the decision. Request for Interpretation, 1950 I.C.J. at 396-97 (stating that
the court's earlier decision "contain[ed gaps of such a nature as to render its execution
impossible"). The court's second interpretation was not satisfactory to the parties, because the
court decided the interpretation request was inadmissible. Id. at 403-04. Ultimately, the
court's third decision was a solomonic determination that Colombia was not obligated to
surrender the refugee, but that the asylum should have ended after the first judgment. Haya
de la Torre, 1951 I.C.J. at 82. This brief story illustrates the difficulty of determining whether
compliance has occurred in a particular case. The initial decisions failed to elicit compliance.
However, the ultimate determination that Haya de Ia Torre could leave the embassy occurred
within a reasonable enough time, so the final decision is coded as eliciting compliance.
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contrast, when the underlying dispute involves another game with
a single equilibrium, it is less probable that dispute resolution can
be effective. Factors that might influence whether there is a
coordination game include the costs of conflict: When both parties'
worst outcome is conflict, that is, the cost of conflict relative to
losing the case is high, the parties have a greater interest in
coordinating. In contrast, when one party is much stronger than
another, the stronger party may not have an interest in coordinating
because the costs of conflict for that party are small relative to
losing the dispute.
The following subsections elaborate on how border disputes and
diplomatic protection involve coordination problems the court can
assist in resolving.
a. Border Disputes
Twenty-four ICJ cases filed and twenty-one decisions on the
merits involved borders and maritime delimitation, an area that has
received surprisingly little attention in the literature on the links
between international law and international relations.2 Border and
maritime delimitation is the major function of the ICJ, however,
comprising over a third of the nonadvisory jurisdiction of the
court.249 Border disputes are frequently submitted by special
agreement to the court. Indeed, all but two disputes submitted
under special agreement to the court concerned border or maritime
delimitation.
Border cases are in essence a Hawk/Dove game that arises out of
the convention of property discussed earlier.25 The institution of
property arises out of a simple convention that possessors play
248. But see A ROAD MAP To WAR, supra note 10; Evan Luard, Frontier Disputes in Modern
International Relations, in T1 INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF FRONTIER DISPUTES 7 (Evan
Luard ed., 1970) (describing the important role of frontier disputes in international relations,
especially in the areas of national power assertion and distribution of economic resources);
Jonathan Charney, Progress in Maritime Boundary Delimitation Law, 88 AM. J. INTL L. 227,
227 (1994) (noting "there are more judgments and awards on maritime boundary disputes
than on any other subject of international law"); Guzman, supra note 6, at 67-68.
249. The Permanent Court of International Arbitration in the Hague also has conducted
some arbitrations concerning these issues. See, e.g., Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, 40 I.L.M. 900
(2001).
250. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
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Hawk and nonpossessors play Dove. This might lead one to predict
that in allocating international territory, nations might simply
follow a rule that says that first possessors defend territory. This
convention, however, like others, is subject to ambiguities. Rarely
do nations physically possess every inch of a putative border in the
sense of having soldiers stationed along it; such expenditure of
resources would be prohibitive. States can reduce the costs of
exclusion by developing conventions about borders, but this requires
coordination as to where the precise border lies. For various
reasons, there may be ambiguities as to where a border lies.
Imagine two states, A and B, that share a border and are trying
to decide precisely where it is. The central problem is that each
state would prefer to have more territory, but would like to avoid a
war over borders with its neighbor. The underlying dynamics of the
game thus involve both conflict and cooperation. The states are in
conflict because each would prefer to capture more territory by
moving the border farther toward the other party, but the states
share an interest in avoiding a costly war.
The border game is illustrated in Figure 7. A and B each choose
whether to send their troops into the contested territory (Hawk) or
to stay out of it (Dove). As represented in Figure 7, the four possible
strategy combinations are AH. BD) (AH, BH} (AD, BH) (AD, B"). The
dotted lines represent the two equilibria.
Figure 7: The Border Game
uncontested territory of A
------------------------- AD, BH
contested territory
................................ A HBD
uncontested territory of B
A would prefer to set the border at the dotted line (AH, BD), while
B would prefer to set the border at the dashed line {ADBH). If both
play the aggressive strategy (AH, BH), they will have a possibly
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violent border conflict as they meet between the two lines. If both
play the passive strategy (AD, BD), the territory between the two
lines will be lost to both, although they avoid a costly war.
What the parties to the border game need is a third party to
identify a line so that the parties will know precisely how far to send
their troops. Perhaps because the existence of a line is more
important than the location of it, it is generally recognized that
problems of border delimitation can involve extralegal consider-
ations even though equity is not one of the conventional sources of
international law.25' This is consistent with the notion that judges
are not applying a pre-existing legal rule but resolving the dispute
to solve a problem of coordination.
These principles are well illustrated in what is perhaps the most
famous international decision on maritime delimitation, the North
Sea Continental Shelf case. 252 This case is typical of a high-profile
dispute over valuable territory. This dispute arose with the
discovery of mineral resources in the North Sea during the 1960s,
which led to heightened competition among the coastal states for
control over the continental shelf. Just as scarcity among individu-
als can lead to pressures for private property rights in a previously
253common property regime, greater demand for resources led todemand to delineate a boundary between states' maritime zones.25
251. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J.
3 (Feb. 20); Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahr.), 40 I.L.M. 847,
892-94 (July 2001) (adjusting equidistance line in light of equitable principles). That border
problems are fundamentally coordination problems in character may be reflected in Article
62(2) of the Vienna Convention on treaties, which states that changed circumstances may not
be the basis of a party asserting unilateral suspension of obligations. Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 62(2), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,347 (signed but not ratified
by the U.S. on Apr. 24, 1970), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679. Because border problems are
frequently random solutions to problems of coordination, and lie at the basis of the modern
system of territorially distinct nation states, it is especially important not to re-open the
solution once reached. To do so threatens permanent instability.
252. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 3; see also Wolfgang Friedmann, The
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases-A Critique, 64 Am. J. INTL L. 229 (1970) ("The decision
of the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases is surely one
of the most interesting as well as debatable decisions in the history of the Court.") (citation
omitted).
253. See, e.g., Martin J. Bailey, Approximate Optimality of Aboriginal Property Rights, 35
J. LAW & EcON. 183, 185-86 (1992); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57
AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350-51 (1967).
254. The legality of these claims had only recently developed in international law, following
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The geography of the North Sea was such that if each state asserted
its maximum legal claim, the claims would conflict with those of
others. Thus, the states had to negotiate agreements delimiting the
various zones of exclusive exploitation. Whereas most of the
delimitation was achieved by negotiation, West Germany was
unable to resolve all delimitation issues with Denmark and the
Netherlands, and concluded special agreements with each state
calling on the ICJ to declare what principles and rules were
applicable to the delimitation.5 5 The court joined the cases.25
The major function of the court was to clarify which interpreta-
tion of the convention of delimitation was applicable.25 7 One
interpretation was expressed in the Continental Shelf Treaty, part
of a package of agreements adopted by the first UN Conference on
the Law of the Sea, and called for equidistance from the shore as the
principle for delimitation in such circumstances.25 s Germany,
however, had a concave coast that would give it a relatively small
portion of the shelf under this rule. 9 Germany argued instead that
equity should be applied, so that a large state with a long but
concave coastline would be given a "just and equitable share" of the
shelf.2" In the alternative, Germany argued that the equidistance
principle should be modified in accordance with the "special
circumstance" of a concave coastline, to use a favorable baseline for
determining equidistant shares of the shelf.261' Germany thus
emphasized the potential incompleteness of the convention,
asserting that principles employed in delimiting a normal coastline
should not apply to the particular circumstances of this case.
One of the major issues for the court was whether the Continental
Shelf Treaty was applicable to the dispute notwithstanding the fact
the 1945 proclamation by President Truman claiming exclusive rights for the United States
to exploit its own continental shelf. Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. §§ 67-68 (1943-1948)
(Sept. 28, 1945). The 1958 Law of the Sea conventions further developed and codified these
rules. Law of the Sea: Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 1608, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
255. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 12-13.
256. Id. at 19.
257. See id. at 6.
258. Id. at 10.
259. See id. at 17.
260. Id. at 20.
261. Id. at 21.
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that Germany was not a party to the treaty.262 This involved
clarifying the state of an ambiguous convention about the circum-
stances when treaties reflect customary international law. Did the
Continental Shelf Treaty codify customary international law, in
which case the rules would apply to Germany, or was it a progres-
sive development of international law, in which case Germany could
not be bound without its consent? The court answered that the
latter was the case. 2' Thus the equidistance principle had not
become a part of customary international law.26'
This finding, however, did not fully answer the question of how
the Shelf was to be delimited. In the absence of binding rules, the
court determined that equitable principles had to be applied in
delimiting the Shelf.265 Here the court had a task of choosing among
many asymmetries to select one that would be salient for the task.
In the end, the court adopted language that was favorable to
Germany, by asserting the "natural prolongation" of the land
territory as a principle to guide subsequent negotiations. 266 Natural
prolongation was similar to the solution offered by Germany, in that
it emphasized the size and length of the German coastline. In fact,
the land territory was simply one possible asymmetry on which to
focus. Contemporary commentators criticized the court for selecting
just one among many possible asymmetries. 67
The underlying game was a Hawk/Dove game, like other border
disputes involving valuable territory. The problem for the states in
this case was ambiguity as to the scope of the conventional rules
regarding the delimitation of boundaries: the convention was both
fuzzy in the sense that the current state of the law was unclear, and
potentially incomplete in the sense that it was not certain whether
the North Sea situation was exceptional, even had the general
principles been clear. The role of the Court decision was to clarify
262. Id. at 3, 6.
263. Id. at 41.
264. See id. at 46.
265. Id. at 47.
266. See id.
267. See, e.g., Friedmann, supra note 252, at 239 (criticizing the decision and noting that
the court took "one particular and limited aspect out of the thousands of inequalities of
natural bounty"); see also North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 239 (Lachs, J.,
dissenting) ("[A] much wider spectrum of factors should be taken into account--e.g., the
comparative wealth and economic potential of the States concerned.").
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these ambiguities. The Court's solution had elements of cheap talk,
selecting particular asymmetries to focus on in delimitation, which
was then sufficient to help the parties overcome the Hawk/Dove
game. After the Court decision, the parties were ultimately able to
resolve the problem themselves by concluding delimitation agree-
ments.26
b. Other Property-Type Disputes
Even aside from defining borders, much of the jurisdiction of the
ICJ involves conventions about property, that is, the extent of a
state's physical control over territory on land or sea. An interesting
and typical example is a case (categorized along with six similar
cases as "Other" in Table 2) that arose in the context of decoloniza-
tion.269 Portugal had a small number of colonies in Southwest India
at the time of Indian independence from Britain. The colonies
268. A further element of coordination involves domestic actors. Fischer notes that the goal
of the resolution in North Sea was "a negotiated settlement in which, by definition, no
government was going to have its way completely." Fischer, supra note 233, at 271. In
particular, the presence of a legal decision allowed the Danish government to make territorial
concessions that they otherwise could not have. This blame-shifting element may also be
present in noncoordination situations, such as the Nuclear Tests case. Nuclear Tests (Austl.
v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 338 (Aug. 28). One can view this as a two level game, where an adverse
decision on the international plane helps a government gain latitude on the domestic plane.
The state gains credit for trying to advance national interests, and has an excuse for begging
off the aggressive strategy once the court decides against it.
Other types of border issues involve simple fuzzy asymmetries. In 1959, the Dutch and
Belgian governments asked the court to determine whether a small parcel of land belonged
to the Dutch commune of Baarle-Nassau or the Belgian commune of Baerle-Duc. Sovereignty
Over Certain Frontier Land (Belg. v. Neth.), 1959 I.CJ. 209 (June 20). The land in question
involved overlapping plots that were not contiguous to the other portions of the respective
communes. The border between the two communes had been established in a note between
them in 1841, but a note drafted by the Mixed Boundary Commission established by the two
governments two years later listed the plots differently with the result that two plots of land
were alleged to have remained with the Belgian commune. See id. at 213-16. The Dutch
argument was, in part, one of adverse possession, that acts of sovereignty over the land since
the 1840s established it as Dutch territory. Id. at 227. In terms of our framework, this is the
fuzzy asymmetry raised by questions of adverse possession or acquisitive prescription. Does
physical possession give title? Which state was in the position to play the role of possessor?
The court turned to evaluating the various acts of each state vis-&-vis the territory and found
that Belgium had not given up its claims of sovereignty that were definitively established by
the national-level Mixed Boundary Commission. Id. at 227-30. The result was a decision with
which there has been compliance.
269. Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6 (Apr. 12).
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included two enclaves completely surrounded by Indian territory,
which normally would allow rights of overflight and passage
between them. India's stated policy was to end all vestiges of
European colonialism from the subcontinent. When an internal
insurrection in 1954 ended Portuguese control, India suspended all
rights of passage to the enclaves, preventing Portugal from reestab-
lishing its authority.27 ° Portugal filed a suit demanding reestablish-
ment of a right of passage to the territories.27" '
This case also concerned a type of Hawk/Dove dispute. Portugal
could have sought to reclaim the enclaves by force, but India might
have responded with force leading to a war. Portugal's other option
was to acquiesce, but this was not attractive for the signal it might
provide to other colonies considering a revolt. Thus, Portugal's first-
best outcome would be to retake the enclaves without Indian
challenge (a Hawk/Dove outcome), its second-best outcome would be
to acquiesce to India's blockade (a Dove/Hawk outcome), and its
worst outcome would be to challenge India and end up in war (the
Hawk/Hawk outcome). Similarly, India's best outcome was to
maintain the blockade without challenge by Portugal (Hawk/Dove),
its second-best outcome would be to allow passage without fighting
Portugal (Dove/Hawk), and its worst outcome would be to be
challenged by Portugal (Hawk/Hawk).
The court in this case was asked to clarify the scope of the
convention through signaling its views on the particular history of
the territory. The court could help the parties determine which
strategy the other party was likely to play by clarifying the scope of
the conventions governing rights of passage. Indeed, the precise
decision issued by the court directly affected these strategies, for the
court's decision issued in 1960 held that a right of passage had
existed in 1954 for Portugal, but had been limited to civilian and not
military purposes. This effectively meant that Portugal could not
reassert control over the territory without violating international
law. Given that an insurgent government had been set up in the
enclaves, this meant that India had effectively won the dispute and
continued to blockade Portuguese military travel. Subsequently,
270. See id. at 24-25.
271. Id. at 26.
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India occupied the territories in question and eventually annexed
them.
272
c. Diplomatic and Other Immunities
Diplomatic immunities constitute eight of the eighty-two filed
cases, with a high proportion of those leading to a merits decision.273
Sovereign and diplomatic immunity is an ancient body of customary
international law, reflecting the dynamics of reciprocity.274 Diplo-
matic representatives are "hostages" to the other side. Killing the
foreign king's envoy means that your own envoy is likely to be
killed, providing for a self-enforcing solution to a stag hunt game.
Imagine a game in which states can choose to respect or not respect
the foreign envoy. Both states would prefer to respect each other's
envoys; but if they believe the other state will not, they will
reciprocate and coordination will occur around the "no respect"
outcome. Most of the time, states coordinate in respecting envoys.
It is only in rare circumstances, such as the Iranian revolution, that
states target the diplomatic and consular property of other states.275
Despite this apparently self-enforcing nature of the game, there
is still room for ambiguities in the convention of diplomatic
protection. There is the need to specify, especially in an ongoing
iterated prisoners' dilemma, what actions will constitute defection
or cooperation. Should one party move to an off-equilibrium
272. Id. at 24-25. Another category of cases concerns property expropriation. Typically at
issue in these cases is an expropriation by one state of the property of another state or its
national. In the latter case, the government is espousing the claim of one of its citizens. See
Electronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 17 (July 20); Barcelona Traction,
Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 5). The motivation of a government
in such a case may be face-saving: For domestic reasons, neither state would like to admit it
is wrong, but espousing the claim allows a creditor state to show its investors that it is doing
something about the dispute. The underlying disputes in such cases frequently concern a
convention whose precise coverage is unclear, namely the norm against taking of property
without compensation. This convention, which receives wide agreement as a general principle,
raises many issues, such as: what standard of compensation is required and whether it is met
in a particular case, whether a regulation can constitute a taking, and what state action is
required to attribute interference with property to a state. By clarifying the convention, the
court can help the parties coordinate their strategies.
273. See supra Table 2.
274. See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 32, at 1151; Swaine, supra note 27, at 562.
275. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J.
42 (May 24).
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strategy, turning to a third party can help return the parties to the
equilibrium path.
Frequently these disputes involve questions of the scope of
conventions on diplomatic immunities. For example, a recent
Belgian law provided for "universal jurisdiction" in international
criminal cases involving human rights violations.276 International
criminal cases typically involve military commanders and senior
political figures who are sometimes protected by special immunities.
In April 2000, the Belgian government issued an arrest warrant for
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Congo, Abduluye Yerodia, on
charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.2 7 The Congo
claimed that a sitting Minister of Foreign Affairs enjoyed a form of
immunity from criminal prosecution, akin to that given to diplomats
and heads of states, to allow him to perform his duties. The court
agreed and found the issuing of the arrest warrant to be illegal.279
The arrest warrant was subsequently quashed, and the Belgian
government also passed domestic legislation to conform to the terms
of the decision. 2 0 Thus, the decision generated compliance.
This case required the court to clarify the scope of applicable rules
when two sets of conventions come into conflict. One set is the
ancient law of diplomatic and other immunities. The other is the
recent efforts to expand international criminal law and to hold
leaders accountable for war crimes. Which convention should trump
required a judicial determination.
Furthermore, there was ambiguity as to whether a particular
class of person, namely the sitting minister of foreign affairs, fell
within the conventions governing immunities. The court's role here
was similar to that in the more famous case involving former
Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet." 1 Pinochet was in the United
Kingdom for medical treatment when a Spanish judge issued a
request for extradition to Spain on charges related to the deaths of
276. See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Beig.), 2002 I.C.J.
1, 2 (Feb. 14).
277. Id. at 1.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 53-54.
280. Id.
281. R. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Mag., Exparte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [20001 1 A.C.
61 (H.L. 1998) (Eng.).
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Spanish citizens in Chile.28 2 The question was whether Pinochet
should be able to rely on immunities normally granted to heads of
state to be free from criminal prosecution. Pinochet was not in office,
and the convention was unclear as to former heads of state alleged
to have committed human rights violations while serving as head of
state: no court had ever decided the question. Although Chile
argued that he should be immune from criminal process as a former
head of state, the House of Lords ultimately disagreed.'
The courts in these cases were clarifying the scope of the conven-
tions on immunity. They were not signaling particular facts or
states of the world: The parties acknowledged that the conventions
were unclear. The courts' decisions were based on cheap talk, and
yet were effective in helping the parties coordinate their strategies
in major and high profile diplomatic disputes.'
282. Id
283. Pinochet was ultimately not extradited because of medical infirmities, and allowed to
return to Chile where he was declared unfit to stand trial.
284. Although slightly outside the scope of our focus on interstate dispute resolution, it is
worth noting that the ICJ may give advisory opinions on legal questions presented by
competent international organizations. These can be efforts by international organizations
to influence behavior through cheap talk. Most advisory opinions concern questions about the
role, status, and constitutional nature of international organizations on the international
plane. An example is the question of whether a special rapporteur for the U.N. Commission
on Human Rights is entitled to immunity that would be accorded to the staff of international
organizations. See Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, 1998 I.C.J. 423 (Aug. 10). In 1995, a
Malaysian who was serving as Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers gave an interview to a magazine that led to several civil lawsuits against him for
defamation, seeking over $100 million in damages. A 1999 Advisory Opinion by the ICJ,
brought by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, held that the Special
Rapporteur should have immunity from civil suits for comments made in his official capacity.
See Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the
Commission of Human Rights, 1999 I.C.J. 61 (Apr. 29). A year later, a Malaysian appeals
court overturned one of the judgments, though whether the ICJ decision generated full
compliance is unclear because the court held the Rapporteur liable for legal costs.
In advisory opinions, the function of the court is to use cheap talk to create conventions that
enhance the status and effectiveness of the relevant organization and its personnel. One can
view the incentives of the affected states as approximating an iterated prisoners' dilemma.
Each state would prefer not to grant immunity to the staff of an international organization,
yet presumably all states are better off with the presence of effective international
organizations. Through cheap talk, the court can create a convention about the precise scope
of immunity that allows parties to coordinate their behavior.
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4. The Limits of the ICJ: The Use of Force
So far, we have examined cases in which the ICJ generated high
levels of compliance with its adjudicative solutions. However, the
focal point or signaling function of international adjudication is less
likely to work in the area of armed conflict."' Armed conflict, one
might say, results from a failure to coordinate expectations.M
Therefore, the focal outcome has failed to emerge. Sometimes armed
conflict may result because the underlying dispute does not involve
a coordination game; one party may prefer conflict to losing the
dispute. It is not surprising that the ICJ has not played a major role
in resolving such problems. Of twenty-three filed cases involving the
use of force, only five binding orders or final decisions have been
rendered. 7 Only two of these have led to compliance."
This failure may result from a number of factors. First, the ICJ
process is slow and time-consuming, so that prospective power
positions at the time of filing are unlikely to remain constant
through the proceedings. This means states' initial interest in
coordination may be in fact moot by the time the court produces a
decision. Second, having never successfully resolved an armed
conflict, the ICJ has no reputation for being able to do so, relative,
for example, to a powerful third-party state actor. In conflict
situations state actors and international organizations can help
provide resources to build confidence, develop an agreement,
monitor compliance, and police the agreement. The court has none
of these resources and is therefore likely to attract filings in cases
where, for example, a state seeks publicity in its dispute rather than
an actual resolution.
An advisory opinion might illustrate the way the court can be
used for publicity rather than coordination. In a famous decision in
1996, the court declined to answer a request from the World Health
Organization (WHO) that the court declare the use of nuclear
weapons to be illegal. 9 Clearly the WHO hoped to influence state
285. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 6, at 1883.
286. See Charles Boehmer, War Is in the Error Term, 53 bT' ORG. 567, 571-72 (1999).
287. See supra Table 2.
288. See supra Table 2.
289. Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1996 I.C.J. 66
(July 8).
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behavior through the desired declaration, but the legality or lack
thereof of nuclear weaponry is hardly a coordination game. The
WHO was not a nuclear party seeking to resolve a dispute. No
nuclear state supported the WHO's petition, suggesting that they
saw the effort as one of political embarrassment rather than a
serious attempt at arms control. State decisions to possess or not
possess these weapons were unlikely to be influenced by a judicial
decision, and the court ducked the issue.
In short, the ICJ may receive filings in cases that do not involve
coordination games. It is unlikely, however, that a court without the
power to impose sanctions can sufficiently change the payoffs to the
parties so as to be effective in such instances. Coordination games,
in contrast, do not require the court to change the payoffs to be
effective. Cheap talk and signaling are sufficient in many cases to
generate compliance, because the parties have an interest in
coordinating around the pronouncement of the court.
The ICJ is, in essence, a mostly consensual forum used by states
to resolve problems that involve coordination. It should not surprise
us that the problems that it resolves on the merits, including border
and diplomatic protection issues, are those in which the stakes of
the dispute are relatively low compared with the cost of conflict
between two nations. This is the essence of the Hawk/Dove game. As
E.H. Carr put it some sixty years ago:
The majority of international disputes which have in the past
been settled by arbitration or by some other legal procedure
have been either pecuniary claims or disputes about national
frontiers in remote and sparsely inhabited regions. The exclu-
sion ... of disputes affecting "vital interests," "independence" or
"national honour" meant the exclusion of precisely those matters
on which political agreement could not be attained. °
That the disputes resolved by international courts are low stakes
relative to larger conflicts does not mean that international law is
trivial or irrelevant. Indeed, we have showed that international
adjudication is essential to resolve coordination games in some
circumstances. On the other hand, one should not expect more than
290. E.H. CARR, THE TWENTY YEAs CRisis 1919-1939, at 196 (1964).
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is plausible from international adjudication. Those theorists who
focus on legitimacy may expect that the court can be effective when
it cannot be. Reputation theorists may over- or underpredict the
effectiveness of the court because they fail to understand how the
court can resolve coordination problems even among states with
very limited interaction. The ICJ, like other interstate dispute
resolvers, helps avert potential conflicts from escalating by provid-
ing focal points and signals that can resolve the dispute. In the
process, the court also develops rules for future cases that clarify
conventions. The essential role of the ICJ is as a coordinating
device.
CONCLUSION
This Article pursued Professor Abbott's suggestion to "reason
forward from a theoretical understanding of particular issue areas
to richer explanations of the meaning and function of international
agreements, procedures and institutions.""' The game theory
concept of coordination explains compliance with international
tribunals. Even in a state of anarchy, when nations face repeated
games of coordination, conventions emerge. The coordinated
expectations underlying a convention allow nations to avoid conflict.
Ambiguity inevitably prevents the convention from perfectly
coordinating expectations, however, and in this situation adjudica-
tion can work expressively, without sanctions, by clarifying the
convention and the state of the world to which it applies. Adjudica-
tion can both construct a focal point and provide a signal that causes
national leaders to update their beliefs, both of which can influence
their behavior.
International adjudication should therefore be understood for
what it is. Rather than serving as a utopian institution that can end
all international conflict, international adjudication such as that
provided by the ICJ can only provide solutions to parties faced with
coordination problems. Compliance with ICJ decisions can occur,
even absent centralized enforcement mechanisms, because the
decisions make one outcome focal or provide an important signal of
the state of the world, either of which facilitates the parties in
291. Abbott, supra note 34, at 2.
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ordering their own affairs. The law as declared by the ICJ and other
international institutions is merely expressive, but expressive law
often works to resolve or avoid disputes. In arguing that coordina-
tion problems deserve more attention in international relations and
international legal scholarship, we have used realist/rational choice
assumptions of optimizing behavior and self-interest to expand the
understanding of the functions law can play. But our approach is
clearly institutionalist in character, seeking to understand how
institutions can resolve conflicts and what purposes they serve.
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